Why Do the Poor Tolerate Inequality? Weak State, Clientelism and Preference for Redistribution

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Abstract

Why do the poor tolerate income inequality and have a low demand for redistribution in some of the worlds most unequal democracies? In this paper, it is argued that low state capacities and the prevalence of clientelistic political exchanges in these countries explain this empirical anomaly. Specifically, when the state capacity is low, the poor dislike the proposal of redistribution by the welfare system because they do not trust the governments ability to implement it. Moreover, when political parties mobilize their constituents through clientelistic exchange, they effectively provide the poor with an alternative risk-hedging strategy beyond the benefits they can expect from the welfare system. The two mechanisms jointly make social policy less appealing to the poor and explain the empirical findings that redistributive preferences of the poor vary and are lower than theoretical predictions. In this paper, a formal model is considered to characterize the micro foundation of this mechanism. The theory is then tested with a combination of macro-level data of state capacity and clientelism and micro-level opinion data. A global pattern with cross-national opinion data from the World Value Survey is shown, and it is verified by data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project. The empirical results show moderate support for the theory both at the macro and the micro levels.

In some of the worlds most unequal countries, if the low-income population is asked whether they would vote for social policies that would reduce income inequality, they most likely would not. Materialist models of redistributive politics that assume the existence of self-interested, profit-maximizing individuals predict that the poor always demand more redistribution than the rich and that the poor want more redistribution in societies with high income inequality (Meltzer and Richard, 1983); however, public opinion data grant only partial support for the former claim and strongly contradict the latter. First, the relationship between income and redistributive preference varies across countries. Figure 1 shows the way income is correlated with the degree to which an individual agreed with equalizing income in 42 democracies during the fifth wave of the World Value Survey conducted from 2005 to 2008. Though for almost all countries the correlation is negative, a large variation is observed, meaning that income is a strong predictor of redistributive preference in some countries but not in others. Thus, the materialistic model, which claims income is the dominant predictor of redistributive preference, is generally correct, but a large variation is unexplained.

Second, in contrast to the theory, the poor demand less redistribution in unequal democracies. Figure 2(a) shows a noisy but evident pattern in which higher income inequality is negatively associated with the poors demand for redistribution. Moreover, Figure 2(b) shows that the correlation between redistributive preference and income approaches zero when inequality increases, which means the poor and the rich tend to agree with each other regarding redistribution in unequal democracies. This pattern summarizes the question that this paper seeks to answer: *Why do the poor agree with the rich regarding a low level of redistribution in unequal democracies?*

[Figure 1 - 2 about here]

This paper explores the way state weakness and clientelistic politics explain the variation in the preference for redistribution around the world. It is argued that the poor demand less redistribution than theoretically predicted for two reasons. First, a weak state leads to the belief that social policies cannot be efficiently implemented. Second, clientelistic benefits provided by political parties serve as an alternative risk-hedging strategy. To embed the arguments in the theory of redistributive preference, it is argued that two assumptions of the baseline materialist model lead to an empirical anomaly and should be reexamined, namely the *strong state* and the *no-alternative* assumptions. The strong state assumption assumes that the poor expect the state to be capable of

redistributing its tax revenue effectively and efficiently. The no-alternative assumption assumes that the poor expect no alternative benefit from political parties in the form of clientelistic exchange in addition to the states welfare system. These two assumptions are reasonable in the study of redistributive politics in advanced democracies. First, advanced democracies generally have state agencies that are effective enough that most citizens expect that an elected government is *capable* of delivering the welfare it promises during an election. Moreover, with fairly developed party finance and electoral rules, a political party can hardly use public money to offer benefits to its constituency in exchange for votes; however, the politics in a large number of developing democracies arguably contradict the assumptions. Thus, for comparative studies with developing countries in the sample, assuming no variation of these two critical variables leads to a misalignment of the theoretical prediction and the empirics.

An extension of the materialist model of redistributive preference is considered to determine how it is shaped by state capacity and clientelistic politics in the developing world. In brief, it is argued that the state capacity determines the extent to which the poor can expect the state to deliver the promised transfer, while the prevalence of clientelistic exchange determines the appeal of a certain transfer to the poor. When the state is weak, it is not in the interest of the poor to demand redistribution from the state because it is understood that the welfare system either cannot deliver the benefits at all or that the costs would be high. Furthermore, if political parties are widely engaged in clientelistic exchange with citizens, the clientelistic benefit the parties deliver with their own organizational capacity can serve as the poors alternative risk-hedging strategies. With clientelistic benefit effectively substituting for transfer by the state, the poor would consider redistribution by the welfare system less appealing and would thus demand less redistribution.

An exploratory analysis of cross-national public opinion data suggested the plausibility of this argument. Figure 3 plots state capacities against the preferences for redistribution of a sample of 42 democracies. The pattern shows that the proportion of the poor demanding redistribution is high where state capacity is high, while the disagreement related to redistribution among income groups also increases by state capacity (moving farther away from the zero line in the graph). Figure 4 plots the way the variety of clientelism across countries is associated with the demand for redistribution. Figure 4(a) illustrates that the poor demand less redistribution as the level of clientelism increases,

while 4(b) indicates that the disagreement among income groups related to redistribution almost disappears when clientelism is extremely prevalent. Figure 5 shows that the redistributive preference of the poor and the disagreement among income groups is associated with the effort of political parties targeting the poor with clientelistic benefits. The patterns shown in all three figures are clear and lend considerable support for the theory proposed. Thus, it makes it interesting to further specify the theory and to subject its prediction to more robust empirical tests.

In this paper, the proposed theory on how state capacity and clientelistic party politics change demand for redistributive preference is formalized, and the hypotheses derived from the model both at the macro and micro levels are tested with global and regional opinion data. The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, the literature is discussed, and the way this paper goes beyond existing considerations is explained. In the second section, the theory is specified using a simple formal model. In the third section, the theory is tested based on opinion data from 42 countries. The data are introduced, and then the findings at both the macro and micro levels are presented. In the fourth section, the theory is subjected to an additional empirical test with micro-level data from Latin American countries. The fifth section concludes the paper, and the limitations and plan for future research is discussed in the final section.

[Figure 3 - 5 about here]

1 Literature Review

The theory proposed in this paper builds upon a large literature base that has examined the variety of preferences for redistribution around the world. A majority of the discussions on the topic depart from the basic workhorse' materialist model initially developed by Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1983). The theory explains redistributive preference by assuming there are rational citizens who maximize their post-tax-and-transfer income and vote for an optimal tax rate during the democratic process. In its simplest form, the model formalizes voting decisions in a country imposing a flat tax rate and providing the same lump sum transfer to myopic individuals. It yields *micro*- and a *macro*-level predictions: (1) individual demand for redistribution increases as income increases, and (2) the equilibrium tax rate of a democracy increases

as its level of inequality increases. That is, the higher the difference between the median and average income of a country, the higher the redistributive demand.

The existing literature that extends this model can be classified into two subsets. The first set of extensions relaxes its behavioral assumption of myopic, income-maximizing individuals, while the second examines the variation of the tax and transfer structure. Through a closer examination of the extension on the behavioral assumption, it can be further divided into two parts. One part recognizes that people are primarily concerned with their current income but attempt to theoretically internalize the other concerns. For instance, this includes income in the past and expected income in the future (Margalit, 2013; Stegmueller, 2013), the externality of inequality on the productivity of the society that influences economic performance (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009), crime (Rueda and Stegmueller, 2013), and the effort level of the society (Piketty, 1995). That is, this group of literature studies argues that individuals are concerned with considerations beyond their current interests only because they can be interpreted as or can affect current income. The second subset of this literature adopts a more radical approach to argue that individuals have other concerns independent of their material self-interest, including religion (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009), group and national identification (Shayo, 2009), partisanship (Margalit, 2013), and beliefs related to the importance of luck as a determinant of success (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). This strand of literature extends upon the baseline materialist model by enriching the individual-level model. These studies have examined how people perceive their payoffs *given* certain social policies.

Another important strand of literature explains preference over redistribution in consideration of the variety of the tax and transfer systems across countries. The studies in this strand show that who gets what from social policies are crucial determinants of individual preferences. Beramendi and Rehm (2016) examines the relationship between the progressivity of the tax structure and the polarization of support for the welfare system across advanced industrial countries. They find that the more a progressive tax makes income a stronger predictor of redistributive preference, the stronger the disagreement among income groups. Holland (2014) shows the effect of transfer structure on redistributive preference, arguing that the poor support redistribution less if the welfare state is truncated (i.e., not benefiting the lowest income group).

Overall, the above two sets of literature on the topic attempt to answer the question re-

garding why the empirical findings of redistributive preference deviate from the baseline materialist model using two approaches: adapting the individual behavioral assumption and examining the tax and transfer structures. The former are micro-level arguments, while the latter seek a macro-level explanation.

The theory of this paper joins the latter set of literature in a broad sense while distinguishing itself from existing works in its theoretical assumption and empirical sample. In short, this paper contributes to the literature of social policy preference by (1) conditionalizing the presumed existence of a capable state, (2) considering non-programmatic political mobilization when theorizing individuals preferences related to social policy, and (3) including both developed and developing countries in the empirical study with an emphasis on the developing world, where a large variation of state capacity and the prominence of clientelistic politics is observed.

First, this paper abolishes the assumption that a sufficient state capacity is required to deliver social policy. The models of individual preferences, despite their variety of behavioral and institutional assumptions, share one commonality, which is that individuals believe that the state is *capable* of taxing and delivering goods. The majority of the works in this literature presumes that individuals vote for their desired social policies as though the policies can be effectively and efficiently implemented. This assumption remains legitimate across many studies because they draw on a sample of advanced capitalist countries, where the states are sufficiently strong and citizens need not be concerned with a possible discrepancy between the making and the implementation of social policies. This is not necessarily the case among developing countries, where state capacity can be very low. It is noteworthy that Holland (2014), the only work reviewed that focuses on the developing world, apparently accepts the strong state assumption. According to its theory, the poor does not question the states *capacity* to redistribute, but this population is only aware that social policies do not cover it as a fact. In this paper, it is argued that individuals value redistribution less when the state is weak because they do not believe that the state is capable of implementing the policies.

Second, this paper considers clientelistic political mobilization as a major factor that lowers the poors redistributive demand. The majority of existing works on social policy preferences model individual utilities as the net of post-tax income and transfer from social policy, but this utility function is at best incomplete in countries where non-programmatic political mobilization prevails. It is argued that individuals value

social policy less when they are offered more clientelistic benefits. In formal language (as will be elaborated in the following section), the marginal gain from social policies decreases when the amount of clientelistic benefits offered increases. This is because social policy and clientelistic benefits share the function of insuring the poor against risks. Considering the two goods as substitutes for each other, the poor who have been offered non-programmatic political mobilization demand fewer social policies that serve the same ends, but in weak states, they are somewhat costlier. Third, the empirics of this paper operate at multiple layers. Both macro-level patterns and micro foundations are examined. In addition, both cross-national studies among a set of 42 countries and a regional analysis among a small sample of developing countries have been conducted. The empirics are designed to (1) directly address the empirical puzzle, (2) prove the generalizability of the theory, and (3) claim the robustness of the discovered pattern.

It should be noted that this paper is not the first to examine the relationship between state capacity, social policy, and non-programmatic political mobilization. Kitschelt (2015), one of the latest contributions to the topic, argues that programmatic party competition, along with civil liberty and state capacity, are positively correlated with universalistic social insurance policies among developing countries, primarily in middle-income countries with developmental states. The paper uncovers an important empirical pattern and discusses it both in terms of the supply side and demand side mechanisms, although the micro-foundation it suggests has not yet been tested. In addition, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) finds that clientelism reduces the demand of universal social policy. Keefer (2007) argues that politicians in young democracies cannot make credible pre-electoral promises due to the low legal and bureaucratic capacity of the state. Hence, politicians prefer a patron-client network to personally appeal to their constituents. Though Haggard and Kaufman (2008) considers bureaucratic inefficiency to be the cause of the dynamics of political linkage strategies in young democracies, preference over redistribution is not the variable of interest. Thus, although this paper targets the same topic in a broad sense with these earlier contributions, it is argued that it sufficiently distinguishes itself from them by proposing a micro-level theory that explicitly embeds the consideration of state capacity and clientelism.

Recent contributions to the literature of democratization also address the same issue but from a different theoretical perspective. Soifer (2013) argues that the effect of

inequality on regime change is based on state capacity. Specifically, he argues that given a weak state with limited extractive capacity, the rich do not fear expropriation by the state, and the poor do not expect to benefit from it. This makes inequality a weak predictor of regime change. Developing the theory, Kasara and Suryanarayan (2015*a*,*b*) argue that in weak states, *the rich* are less likely to turn out and are more likely to vote in line with the poor because they are less concerned about taxation under the context of low bureaucratic capacity. Suryanarayan (2015) further suggests that the rich will proactively undermine state capacity if they expect democratization and the consequential redistributive threat. In contrast to the above two authors, who focus on the electoral behavior of *the rich*, Amat and Beramendi (2015) examine that of *the poor*. The study showed that the poor are more likely to turn out at an extremely high level of inequality than when inequality is moderately high due to the omnipresence of non-programmatic political mobilization in an economically unequal democracy.

This paper contributes to these works by providing a micro-foundation for their theories and empirical findings. More broadly speaking, this paper contributes to the literature on both the preference formation of redistribution and distributive politics in the developing world. It is argued that it contributes to both groups of literature. For literature on preference formation, it extends the individual-level model of social policy demand to fit countries with weak states and non-programmatic political mobilization. For literature on distributive politics, it provides a micro-foundation to complement its emerging macro-level studies. In the following sections, the model is first characterized and then tested empirically.

2 The Formal Model

A simple extension of the Meltzer and Richard (1983) model is considered to examine how the variety of state capacity and clientelistic politics affect the formation of redistributive preference. This section begins by characterizing its setup with reference to the bassline model. Then, it discusses how state capacity and clientelism are built into the model. The section concludes by highlighting four hypotheses directly derived from the models comparative statics to be tested in the empirical study, which is presented next.

In its simplest form, the materialist model of preference for redistribution describes a society that imposes a flat tax rate and provides the same lump-sum transfer to everyone. Formally, as Alesina and Giuliano (2009) specifies, the individual-level behavioral model is a constraint maximization problem as follows:

$$\max_t u_i = y_i = \alpha_i(1-t) + c - \frac{t^2}{2} \qquad \text{s.t. } \sum \alpha_i t = nc \Rightarrow \bar{\alpha}t = c$$

where α_i is individual pre-tax-and-transfer income, t_i is the tax rate the individual will vote for, c is the lump sum transfer one receives, $\bar{\alpha}$ is the average income of the country, α_M is the median income of the country, and $\frac{t^2}{2}$ is the distortionary cost of taxation. This model specification, along with the assumption that the median voter decides the tax rate of a society, leads to the following prediction:

$$\text{(Individual) } t^* = \bar{\alpha} - \alpha_i \qquad \text{(Country Equilibrium) } t_E^* = \bar{\alpha} - \alpha_M$$

These are the formal forms of the two predictions of the materialist model of redistribution in which the poor demand more redistribution than the rich and the overall demand for the redistribution of a country increases when it is unequal. The model in this paper improves on it by conditioning the variations of state capacity and clientelistic politics.

The model considered in this paper assumes that part of the tax revenue is redistributed as transfer by the state, as is the baseline model, while part of it is provided to citizens as clientelistic benefits by political parties that have access to public finances. Moreover, due to the inefficiency of the welfare system caused by low state capacity, only a proportion of the transfer can reach citizens. The general setup of the model is specified as follows:

$$\text{(The Rich's Problem)} \qquad \max_{c_R} u_R = \alpha_R(1-t) + v(c|b_R, \theta_b, \theta_c) - \frac{t^2}{2}$$

$$\text{(The Poor's Problem)} \qquad \max_{c_P} u_P = \alpha_P(1-t) + v(c|b_P, \theta_b, \theta_c) - \frac{t^2}{2}$$

$$\text{(Budget Constraint)} \quad \bar{\alpha}t = \bar{b} + c \qquad \text{where} \quad \bar{b} = \lambda b_P + (1-\lambda)b_R$$

$$\frac{\partial v}{\partial c} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 v}{\partial c \partial \theta_c} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 v}{\partial c \partial b_i} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 v}{\partial c \partial \theta_b} < 0 \qquad \text{where } i \in \{R, P\}$$

The crux of the extension, formally, is that individuals utility received from a transfer from the welfare system $v(.)$ depends on the state capacity (θ_c), the clientelistic benefits received (b_i), and the organizational capacity of the political parties that offer the clientelistic benefits (θ_b). This concept focuses on the variety of the first three. Six comparative statics were derived that are subject to empirical tests (see the Appendix for details). For the scope of this paper, the following three predictions are highlighted that were directly derived from the models comparative statics: (1) if state capacity is low, the poor and the rich agree on a low level of redistribution from social policy because the inefficient welfare system makes state-led redistribution a less desirable option as a risk-hedging strategy; (2) if political parties provide clientelistic benefits, the poor agree with the rich on a low level of redistribution from social policy because the poor have alternative risk-hedging strategies offered by political parties; and (3) the effect of clientelism on redistributive preference depends on its allocation to different income groups. When more clientelistic benefits target the poor, the poor are more likely to agree with the rich in demanding a low level of redistribution; however, as a somewhat trivial but theoretically possible equilibrium, if political parties overly target the poor, the rich may demand more redistribution than the poor, leading to an increased polarization in redistributive politics. [1]. These theoretical predictions have been used to form four hypotheses, which are tested using public opinion data.

SC1 The poor demand less redistribution when state capacity is low.

SC2 There is less polarization in redistributive politics when state capacity is low.

CL1 The poor demand less redistribution when they receive clientelistic benefit from political parties

CL2 There is less polarization in redistributive politics when clientelism is prominent.

In the following sections, the four hypotheses are tested using cross-national and regional data both at the macro and the micro levels. In the third section, opinion data from the fifth wave of the World Value Survey across 42 countries are used in combination with the macro-level data of clientelism and state capacity. In the fourth section, the findings related to the international pattern are verified using evidence from Latin America. The findings with different operationalizations and different datasets are consistent with one another, and the results moderately support the four hypotheses.

[1] For more details of the model, please refer to the appendix.

3 Evidence from Cross-national Study

In this section, the theory is tested using the opinion data of 42 democracies around the world. The data are operationalized to address the theoretical prediction from different angles. The first question examined is whether the observed pattern in the bivariate visualization of the introduction is statistically significant in a multivariate regression. An aggregated macro-level indicator is generated to show that the predicted pattern is statistically and substantively significant. Second, whether the predicted correlation holds at the micro level is tested. Specifically, whether individual redistributive preferences are explained by (1) the state capacity and the prevalence of clientelism in the country and (2) trust in the government and acceptance of clientelistic benefit is tested. Using multiple layers for the empirics serves two purposes. First, it is an attempt to bridge the macro level and the micro foundation suggested by the formal model. Second, the models with a variety of operationalizations cross-validate one another.

3.1 Data and Operationalization

The main dependent and independent variables were drawn from the following three datasets, which are the 5th wave of World Value Survey (WVS), the World Governance Indicator (WGI), and the Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP). Specifically, individual redistributive preferences were measured, and state capacity and the tendency to accept clientelistic exchange based on WVS, a large-scale opinion survey taken from 2005 to 2008, were evaluated [2]. State capacity at the macro level is measured with the Government Effectiveness indicator from WGI. Clientelism is measured by indices created with DALP collected by a research team at Duke (Kitschelt, 2013). The dataset is taken from an expert survey in which scholars and journalists from 88 countries with deep knowledge of the party system evaluate the linkage strategies and policy positions of the parties in their countries. The three datasets are further matched with economic development and inequality data from World Development Indicator and the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt, 2016).

The use of the set of data is a compromise between the generalizability of the theory and construct validity. The combination of the datasets provides over 60,000 respon-

[2] http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp

dents from 42 democracies across the world, 25 of which are developing countries. As shown by the empirical analysis, the distribution inequality, economic development, state capacity, and level of clientelism within this group of countries are well-shaped, and thus statistical inferences with simple models is possible; however, the downside of the data is that a number of variables have significant weaknesses in construction, rendering them proxies at best. In this section, the constructs of the dependent and independent variables are introduced, the strengths and weaknesses of the constructs are discussed, and the way potential issues were addressed is explained.

Dependent Variable Individual demand for redistribution is measured based on the responses to the following question in WVS:

> *How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.*
>
> [1] We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort.
> [10] Incomes should be made more equal.

This variable has been chosen as an indicator of redistributive preference because it induces respondents to evaluate the extent to which income should be made equal. As may be assumed, this is not a perfect measurement of redistributive preference for political economists; however, this is arguably the best measurement for redistributive preference in the survey. The measurement problem of the dependent variables was addressed in two ways. First, in addition to using the data in their original coding, they were recoded to distinguish the responses that strongly support the statement of equalizing income (i.e., those choosing a level sufficiently near 10). It is argued that respondents choosing a position sufficiently close to the statement of interest (Income should be made more equal) are subject to minimal influence by the redundant information on the other end of the scale (effort, in this case). Nevertheless, the approach cannot solve the fundamental problem. Thus, a robustness test was conducted in two ways. First, an alternative measurement of redistributive preference was used in the same survey. The survey also asked respondents to share their opinions regarding whether it is the governments responsibility to provide for all citizens and whether equalizing income is an important element of democracies. Empirical analyses were run on these alternative

measurements; however, all these alternative measures are still close proxies of redistributive preferences at best. Consequently, the second strategy was to use a dataset that included a smaller set of countries but of better data quality. The AmericasBarometer from LAPOP2010 was used to check the robustness of the result, as is discussed in the robustness check section.

Independent Variables State capacity and clientelism were measured at both the macro and micro levels. The former was used for both analyses of aggregate preference at the country level and individual level, while the latter was used for individual level analyses only. State capacity was measured using the Government Effectiveness Index from WGI. The indicator is an aggregate of a large set of studies measuring the quality of civil service and the ability of the government to implement policies effectively and independent of political pressures [3]. The intensity of clientelistic political mobilization was measured using data from the DALP dataset. The following two indicators constructed based on the experts responses were used to measure the prominence of clientelistic politics. *General Clientelistic Effort* measures the overall effort of political parties in linking with voters with clientelistic exchanges. *Clientelistic Effort Targeting the Poor* measures the amount of political parties effort in linking *with the poor* using clientelistic strategies. The two indicators were aggregated into party-level variables that indicate the parties level of clientelistic effort based on individual experts responses and were then further aggregated into country level indicators by taking a weighted average across political parties. The macro-level indicators of clientelism discussed in the following sections of this paper use the aggregated clientelism indicators by country.

The indicators of state capacity and clientelism were operationalized at both the national and individual levels. While it is important to understand how individual preferences are influenced by institutional factors using macro-level predictors as operationalized previously, determining how ones preferences are associated with his or her *own* evaluation of state capacity and clientelism can further test whether the mechanism suggested is true; however, WVS has no direct measurement of either state capacity or clientelism. Thus, proxies were constructed for state capacity based on respondents answers regarding the degree to which they trust a listed set of government agencies. A

[3] `http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc`

proxy for exposure to clientelism was constructed using respondents opinions regarding whether it is acceptable to cheat on taxes, to claim benefits one is not entitled to, and to take bribes. [4]

[Figure 6, 7 about here]

Strength and Weakness of the Data and Operationalization Before proceeding with the analysis, a critical issue related to sampling deserves careful examination. The sample of countries used for this study is an interaction of countries with preference data from World Value Survey Wave 5 and those with clientelism data from the DALP dataset, comprising a sample of 42 countries. The primary concern related to the sample is that it includes respondents from both developed and developing democracies, whose mode of party competitions may be radically different. A possible consequence is that the result is driven by the difference between two clusters of countries rather than the suggested variations among individual countries. In the following empirical analysis, the problem is addressed by reporting the results of the estimated with the full dataset and with a subset of developing countries. For the latter, respondents from countries whose GDP per capita are above the 40th quantile in the sample are omitted. [5]. It is argued that estimating the models with the full dataset and the subset of developing countries can ensure the robustness of the results.

The empirics consist of two parts. In the first part, the hypotheses were tested using data at the aggregate level. Opinion data were collapsed into national-level indicators of the poors overall support of redistribution and the polarization by income groups for redistributive preferences. In the second part, the hypotheses were tested using a number of hierarchical models. The independent variables were operationalized in multiple ways, and indicators of state capacity and clientelism were used at both the macro and micro levels.

[4]For more information about the operationalization of variables and how they are linked to the parameters in the formal model, please refer to the Appendix.

[5]In the analysis reported in the paper, I use the threshold 40%, which omits all advanced democracies. As a robustness check, I also use other thresholds, including omitting the top 10%, top 25%, and simultaneously the top 25% and bottom 10%). The results are insensitive to the change. Results using other thresholds are available upon request

3.2 Results: Country-level Analysis

In this section, the hypotheses are tested using aggregated indicators at the country level. Two dependent variables were constructed to measure the poors demand for redistribution and the polarization of redistributive preference. The poor were operationalized as respondents who self-identify their income to be in the bottom two quintiles of the income scale. Also, the poors redistributive preference was measured as the proportion within this low-income group that strongly agrees on the statement of equalizing income. The polarization of the income distribution was operationalized as the Spearman correlation between ones self-identify position on the income scale and the degree to which he or she agrees with the statement regarding equalizing the income scale.

The construction of the two country level indicators takes into account the discrete, ordinal structure of the survey responses concerned as well as their distribution. In this study, the measurement of individual income and redistributive preference were both measured using a 10-point scale. An examination of the distribution of the two variables in the countries in the sample shows that the responses all sufficiently spread across the scale (see the histograms in the Appendix for details). The redistributive preference was aggregated to the country level as the proportion of respondents strongly supporting the statement to capture the group who agree with the position strongly enough to have an implication on his or her real-life political participation, while omitting those who merely express a moderate concern in this environment and who may be unlikely to apply the concerns elsewhere.

Spearmans Rank Correlation Coefficient of income and redistribution was used to measure the polarization of redistributive preference by income. The Spearman Correlation uses the rank of the two variables to compute covariance and variance. This method was used instead of the common Pearson correlation, which uses the real numbers to take into account their nature as discrete variables. It is worth noting that a simple correlation was used instead of the estimated coefficient of income, as some previous studies have used, to minimize the model dependency at this stage. Generating dependent variables with linear models adds overwhelming complications to the issues of construct validity, which should be avoided in this early step of the analysis. Though it is understood that a considerably large number of confounders should be considered when examining the correlation between income and redistributive preference, this is

deferred to the individual level analysis discussed in next section. This section aims to provide initial insights into the empirics with a simple modeling effort. It is argued that regardless of the coarseness of the dependent variables, this section provides a better understanding of the plausibility of the theory proposed in the previous sections.

In general, the results of the country level analyses show marginal support for the state capacities hypotheses, while demonstrating moderate support for the clientelism hypotheses. Twenty-three models were run with state capacity and clientelism as the macro-level independent variables of interest. Due to the considerable collinearity of the variables of interest, they were not used in the model at the same time as the main results reported (Table 1 to 4); however, all results are reported with different combinations of the main variables of interest and the control variables in Figures 8 to 11, which show the average effect across models. Formally, variations of the following linear models are estimated with the unit of analysis being the country:

(Poor's Redistributive Demand)

$$RPpoor_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times Gini_i + \beta_2 StateCap_i + \beta_3 Cliente_i + \beta_4 ClientPoor_i + u_i$$

(Polraization of Redistributive Demand by Income)

$$Corr_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times Gini_i + \beta_2 StateCap_i + \beta_3 Cliente_i + \beta_4 ClientPoor_i + u_i$$

Potential issues related to sampling bias and non-linearity were addressed by examining the distribution and correlation of variables and by subsetting the dataset to exclude advanced democracies. One legitimate concern regarding the results is that the effect, if any, is driven by the fact that the sample includes two clusters of countriesa group of advanced democracies that enjoy high state capacity, low clientelism, and low inequality and a group of developing democracies whose variables of interest are radically different. The univariate distributions of variables show that clustering is unlikely, while the correlation of the variables of interest and the control variables are high. The distribution of variables is mostly smooth and approximates linear or log-linear distribution, meaning outliers along any single variable are unlikely. Nevertheless, as is somewhat unsurprising, a high correlation is found among state capacity, clientelism, and the level of economic development, though this correlation is not linear and the variation is large (see Figures 6 and 7 for details). In particular, a weaker collinearity is considered for state capacity and clientelism among developing countries. Thus, countries whose

GDP per capita is above the 60th percentile of income were omitted, and all the models were re-estimated. [6] The results show that despite the largely decreased number of observations, the directions of the coefficients remain mostly the same. Also, the effect of state capacity is more likely to be in the expected direction among the subsample of developing democracies, which is of theoretical interest and is discussed in later sections.

[Figure 6,7 about here]

A set of linear models were estimated using the poors redistributive demand and the correlation between income and redistributive demand as dependent variables, respectively. The different models include state capacity, the general level of clientelism, and control for the level of inequality and development in most of the models (see the Appendix for full results). Figure 7 shows the results of modeling that explain the poors redistributive preference among 42 developed and developing countries, which provide a moderate level of support for the theory. First, the prediction that high state capacity is associated with the poors higher demand for redistribution (SC1) receives marginal support. The left-most figure shows the coefficients of state capacity across all models. The mean coefficients across all models are trivially positive (as is shown in the black horizontal line, which is the same for the following three figures in this section). Only in the baseline models (estimating the poors redistributive preference with state capacity alone and controlling for inequality) are the coefficients of state capacity relatively large positive numbers. Moreover, all the confidence intervals cross zero (as shown by the dotted red horizontal line). This finding marginally supports the proposed theory at best.

Second, the empirical evidence provides moderate support for the theoretical prediction that clientelism is associated with a decreased redistributive preference among the poor (CL1). As the middle figure shows, general clientelism is negatively correlated with the redistributive preference of the poor. Nevertheless, in all but two baseline models, the confidence intervals cross zero. This means that although the direction is as predicted by the theory, the magnitude is not large enough. It is argued that this is due to the variations in how clientelistic benefits are allocated. In countries where clientelistic effort mostly targets the non-poor, it does not change the poors redistributive prefer-

[6] I chose this threshold so that countries that intuitively belong to the group of advanced democracies are omitted while leaving a decent sample size of 25 for statistical inference. I have also used other looser thresholds (75th, 90th percentile), the results of which remain similar.

ence. Hence, the effect of clientelistic benefits targeting the poor was estimated. As the far-right figure shows, the correlation is negative, and nearly all are significant at the 90% level.

Re-estimating the models without high-income countries in the sample yields similar results. As explained, one concern is that the results may be driven by the difference between developed and developing democracies. Hence, all models were re-estimated after omitting countries whose GDP per capita is above the 60th percentile of the sample (see Figure 8). This reduced the sample to 25 countries. The mean direction shows how state capacity and clientelistic benefits to the poor are associated with the poors redistributive preference, while the coefficients for general clientelism are near zero in all models. It is noteworthy that the magnitude of the effect of state capacity, though its 95% confidence interval still crosses zero, is larger than what is observed when all countries are included. The key finding of these results in favor of the theory is that clientelistic effort towards the poor is robustly negatively correlated with the poors preference for redistribution after controlling for development level, inequality, state capacity, and the general level of clientelism among all countries and the subset of developing countries.

Having tested the hypotheses related to the poors redistributive preference (SC1 and CL1), the two hypotheses related to preference polarization by income were examined (SC2 and CL2). The results show that both general clientelistic effort and clientelistic goods targeting the poor are positively associated with the correlation between income and redistributive preference. This means that when clientelism is prevalent, neither the poor nor the rich have a clear distinction in their demands for redistribution. The figure in the middle and the right of Figures 9 and 10 shows the pattern. The coefficients of all models of the two clientelism variables are positive either among all countries or within the subset of developing countries. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that high state capacity leads to a disagreement on redistribution between the poor and the rich receives partial support from the results. As the left-most figure of Figure 9 and 10 shows, the coefficient is negative in four of the 12 models estimated using data from all countries with only two of them significant at the 90% level. The estimated coefficients with data from developing countries are nearly all positive, which contradicts the hypothesis.

[Figure 8-11 about here]

To conclude the presentation of the empirical results of the country level analysis, there

is moderate support that the poor demand less redistribution when the state capacity and clientelistic effort, especially clientelistic exchange targeting the poor, of political parties is large (hypotheses SC1 and CL1). In addition, there is less polarization in redistributive politics when clientelism is prevalent (CL2), which supports the hypothesis. The strongest and most robust finding across all models is that clientelistic targeting of the poor is always negatively associated with the poors redistributive preference when controlling for state capacity, inequality, and development level. This finding, along with weaker evidence that clientelism in general is negatively correlated with the poors redistributive preference, strongly support the extended materialist model proposed in the previous sectionthe poor essentially maximize their materialist interest in redistributive politics. The missing link between inequality and redistributive preference is likely to be caused by the neglect of alternative benefits they can receive other than state-led redistribution.

The country level analysis shed light on the plausibility of the theory in an easily interpretable way; however, examining individual level mechanisms can provide more details. In the following section, the empirical results from the individual-level analyses are presented. First, it is shown that the macro-level independent variables of state capacity and clientelism affect redistributive preference when individual demographics are controlled. Then, it is shown that individuals redistributive preference is associated with their evaluations of state capacity and clientelism.

3.3 Results: Individual-level Analysis

In this section, the findings from the country-level analyses are applied to the individual level to further test the theory proposed in this paper. First, the way the analysis at the individual-level supplements those of the previous section is explained. Then, the construction of the variables, the models, and the results is described.

There is an empirical and a theoretical motivation to move beyond the macro-level analysis. Empirically, country-level analyses provide interpretable and noise-resistant results, yet they do not take into account a considerably large group of individual-level explanations of preferences over redistribution in addition to income as studies on preference over redistribution have shown, which is reviewed in previous sections. The analysis of this section considers this mechanism and controls for relevant covariates.

The results of this section show that the findings hold after controlling for demographics that have been found to shape redistributive preference.

The theoretical motivation of this section is that the theory proposed is essentially a micro-level model. In this model, individuals form their redistributive preference based on *their understanding* of state capacity and the clientelistic benefits they receive. As can be seen in the characterization of the formal model, the redistributive preference of each agent is a function of his or her income, tax, benefit from the social policy, benefit from clientelism exchange, and state capacity. For the sake of presenting the crux of the theory, state capacity and the level of clientelism are taken as exogenously given to implicitly estimate the contextual effect discussed in the previous section. Though the result is valid because it can be reasonably assumed that an average individual has a correct understanding of state capacity and access to clientelistic goods highly correlated with the expert-rated country indices, some variations were still missing. To address this problem, the results are presented using individual-level proxies of the way one may conceive of state capacity and whether one accepts clientelistic exchange.

In this section, three sets of models are estimated. In the first set of models, macro-level independent variables of state capacity and clientelism are used to estimate individual redistributive preference, controlling for demographics. These models serve to further the argument made in the previous section to understand the contextual effect of state capacity and clientelism on individual preference. In the second set of models, individual-level indicators of the respondents acceptance of clientelistic benefit are used in combination with macro-level state capacity. The purpose of this set of models is to answer the following question: Given the context of state capacity, how is ones redistributive preference related to his or her acceptance of clientelistic benefits? The third set of models uses individual-level indicators for both state capacity and clientelism. It answers the question regarding how ones redistributive preference is shaped by his or her understanding of state capacity and acceptance of clientelistic benefits.

The three sets of models are all logistic regressions that control for individual-level covariates ($\mathbf{Ind.Cov_{ic}}$) and country-level covariates ($\mathbf{Country.Cov_{c}}$), allowing for

intercepts to vary by country (α_c). Formally,

$$
\begin{aligned}
&logit(\text{Pr(Strongly Demand Redist)}_{ic}) \\
&\quad = \beta_0 \text{Poor}_{ic} + \beta_1 State.Cap_{ic} + \beta_2 Client_{ic} \\
&\qquad + \beta_3 \text{Poor}_{ic} \times State.Cap_{ic} + \beta_4 \text{Poor}_{ic} \times Client_{ic} \\
&\qquad + \mathbf{B_5 Ind.Cov_{ic}} + \mathbf{B_6 Country.Cov_c} \\
&\qquad + \alpha + \alpha_c + u_{ic}
\end{aligned}
$$

According to the hypotheses proposed in the previous section, all else equal, high state capacity is associated with a high demand for redistribution ($\beta_1 > 0$), and the prevalence of clientelism is associated with a low demand for redistribution ($\beta_2 < 0$). In addition, according to the polarization hypotheses, high state capacity is associated with a higher polarization of redistributive preference ($\beta_3 > 0$), while the prevalence of clientelism is associated with a lower polarization ($\beta_4 < 0$). As explained, the two variables of interest operate at both the macro level and the individual level.

With macro-level indicators of state capacity and clientelism, the results are interpreted based on how redistributive preference is associated with the political context. On the other hand, when the two variables of interest are Yu Wang, University of Rochester operated at the micro level (in the second and the third set of the models), the interpretation involves how individual evaluations of state capacity and an acceptance of clientelism are associated with redistributive preference, both independently and mediated through income.

The first set of models shows that individuals, especially the poor, demand less redistribution in the political context of highly clientelistic party competition, especially for political parties that devote considerable effort to appealing to the poor through clientelistic exchange. As is shown in Tables 1 and 2, the negative effect of clientelism on individuals redistributive preference, especially the poor, is always significant at the 95% level. The effect holds both in models including all developed and developing countries and among developing countries when controlling for the level of inequality and economic development. It is noteworthy that the effect of clientelistic benefits targeting the poor is not obvious (though still signed as expected) among the full sample, but it is significant among the group of developing countries. State capacity shows an effect opposite to the theory prediction in the models estimated with the full dataset:

higher state capacity is associated with less redistributive preference, and the effect is stronger for the poor. The finding is possibly driven by the developing countries in the sample where state capacity is high, and the poor do not demand redistribution. Upon examination of the effect of state capacity among developing countries, high state capacity is always associated with a higher demand for redistribution. The result supports the hypothesis that clientelism reduces the poors demand for redistribution and depolarizes redistributive preference related to income (CL1 and CL2); however, it fails to support two hypotheses related to state capacity (SC1 and SC2).

Before discussing the analyses involving individual level indicators, the indicators were measured as follows. Three proxies of individuals acceptance of clientelistic benefit were operationalized: the extent to which one believes that claiming benefits that he or she is unentitled to, cheating on tax, and accepting a bribe are justifiable [7]. The responses are at best a close proxy to the degree to which one subscribes to clientelistic benefits and approves of clientelism; however, it is argued that they are a close proxy in the scope of this survey and that responses to the questions are expected to be highly correlated with the variable of interest given the nature of clientelism, as some bribe the constituents and often operate as the client claiming benefits that he or she is not entitled to legally. The individual-level evaluation of state capacity was evaluated based on respondents ratings on their confidence in the government.

The second set of models shows that individual acceptance of clientelistic benefits is negatively associated with redistributive preference after controlling for the political context of state capacity and prevalence of clientelism, but such effect on the poor is not larger than on the rich. The set of models allows individual-level perceptions on clientelism to vary while still using macro-level indicators of state capacity. It captures the scenarios in reality as many comparative works have discovered: among countries with the same level of state weakness, some have political parties that actively build links with constituents with clientelistic benefits, while some do not. Using different operationalizations, it is shown that acceptance of clientelism is negatively associated with redistributive demand for both the poor and the rich. Also, individual confidence in the state among respondents from developing countries is positively correlated with ones redistributive demand both for the poor and the rich (though statistically less sig-

[7] Since this is a question with clear social desirability, the descriptive statistics show over half of the respondents chose the minimal level of acceptability (1 in a scale of 10), while approximately the other half chose from 2 to 10. The data was recoded into binary categoriesthose choosing 1 and the rest.

nificant). There is a small polarization effect of confidence in the state and the depolarization effect on ones acceptance of clientelism among respondents in developing countries. The results hold after controlling for the contextual variables: inequality, development, clientelism, and state capacity. Hence, this set of models provides moderate support for all hypotheses (see Tables 3 and 4 for details).

The third set of models shows that individual confidence in the state leads to higher redistributive preference, and individual acceptance of clientelism leads to less demand for redistribution. Both have a larger effect on the poor. These correlations hold only for respondents from developing countries. Table 6 shows the findings. Four proxies of individual acceptance of clientelist benefits are negatively associated with redistributive preference, and all three coefficients of their interaction terms with the poor indicator are also negative. Confidence in the government is also positively correlated with redistributive demand, both independently and interacting with the poor indicator (the direction is as expected, though the 95% confidence interval passes zero). The findings hold after controlling for all macro-level confounders and contextual variables, as discussed. That is, the empirical evidence shows that controlling for development level, inequality, state capacity, the prevalence of clientelism in the countries, individual confidence in the state, and the tendency to accept clientelistic benefits have the predicted effect on redistributive preference.

To summarize the findings of the individual-level analysis, evidence in support of the theory is found that high state capacity increases the redistributive preference of the poor, while clientelism has the opposite effect. The most robust finding is that within the groups of respondents in developing countries, clientelism or individuals acceptance of clientelistic benefits reduces the demand for redistribution. This effect is evidently stronger for the poor than for the rich. On the other hand, high state capacity or high individual confidence in the state is associated with a higher demand for redistribution; however, it is unclear whether the effect is larger for the poor or for the rich. This section contributes to the country-level analysis evidence by showing that the predicted effect holds after controlling for individual demographics. More importantly, the effect of institutional or contextual predictors holds at the micro level, which directly supports the theoretical model.

In the previous two sections, the theory proposed is supported by cross-national analyses at both the macro and micro levels. It is argued that the findings are substantively

meaningful, though the levels of statistical significance on the effect of interest are not without variation; however, the cross-national data from the World Value Survey arguably suffer from two problems: (1) variable construct validity limited by the way the survey questions are asked and (2) omitted country or regional specific confounder due to the heterogeneity of countries included in the World Value Survey. As discussed in the following section, the two problems are addressed using survey data from AmericasBarometer from the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). In the following section, the way the evidence from LAPOP addresses the problems is explained, and then it is shown that the results support the proposed theory.

4 Evidence from Latin America

In this section, it is shown that the proposed theory holds using public opinion survey data from Latin America. First, two critical issues are discussed that may compromise the validity of the findings presented in the previous two sections: construct validity of variables and unobserved country-level confounders. Then, the way the issues were addressed using data from AmericasBarometer from LAPOP is explained. The reason that the group of countries in Latin America constitutes an interesting sample for this study is provided, and the way the variables of interest were operationalized is characterized. The results from fitting the data into a set of empirical models are presented, based on which it is argued that the theory passes the robustness test. The section concludes with a discussion regarding how the new evidence affects the evidence presented in previous sections.

In previous sections, the way the theory was tested using public opinion data covering a maximal number of countries is explained; however, the pursuit of theory generalizability compromises some construct validity. Constrained by the questions available in the World Value Survey, measures of redistributive preference, income, state capacity, and clientelism are at best close proxies. Redistributive preference was measured using responses to a statement of equalizing income. The problem is that the statement is combined with another statement related to effort, and it does not explicitly mention the role of government or taxation at the other end of the scale. Though the variable was recoded to address the problem and a robustness test was conducted to show the result was insensitive to the alternative coding scheme, it is still reasonable to question

the measurement of the dependent variable.

In addition to the problems related to the construct validity of the dependent variable, the measure of the independent variables may be questioned. First, income is measured as a self-identified position in the countrys income scale. The subjective response leads to an inaccuracy of measure. Moreover, it is potentially endogenous to a set of micro and macro-level factors, such as information about others income and the status-quo redistributive policies of the country, which leads to considerable complexity. Though alleviating the effect was attempted by recoding and testing the results with different coding schemes, it is still imperfect. Second, the acceptance of clientelism at the individual level is proxied by responses to questions regarding whether the acts of accepting a bribe, cheating on taxes, and claiming unentitled benefits are justified. They are close proxies given that clientelist exchanges on many occasions occur as bribes to the voters and involve claiming unentitled benefits, cheating on taxes, and abusing the welfare system; however, the link is not always explicit. In addition, as discussed, they may induce a consideration of state weakness, which may make them highly correlated with individual assessments of state capacity. Finally, state capacity as assessed at the individual level is measured with responses to whether one trusts the government. Though trust in the government is arguably highly correlated with an assessment of state capacity, the relationship may not be linear and is confounded by many micro and macro level factors. For instance, one may respond that he distrusts the government exactly for the reason that he thinks state capacity is high enough to threaten property rights. Given these issues, it should be shown that measurement errors do not drive the discovered empirical pattern in favor of the theory.

In addition, the construct validity problem of unobserved country-specific features may bias the findings. The respondents of the empirical studies described in the previous sections were sampled from a group of heterogeneous countries around the world. As a result, a large number of variables that mediate or confound the correlation of interest, such as the economic development, political context, and culture of the countries, is expected. This issue was addressed by controlling for individual-level demographics and country-level covariates and adding a country fixed effect. Still, this can only alleviate the problem. One way to show that the results are not driven by the variation of unobserved country-specific variables is to show that the results hold among respondents from a homogeneous group of countries.

The opinion data from AmericasBarometer from LAPOP were used to address both problems: to improve construct validity with well-formulated survey questions and to alleviate the problem of unobserved country-specific features by limiting the sample of respondents to a relatively homogeneous region. The LAPOP dataset is ideal for a robustness test not only because it provides accurate measures of the variable of interest but also because it constitutes a representative sample of developing countries regarding its variation of state capacity and clientelism. As shown in Figure 12, among the group of 88 democracies with available clientelism data from the DALP dataset, the sample of Latin American countries spreads across the high-clientelism-low-capacity half of the figure, which includes mostly developing countries. The variation of state capacity and clientelism of the Latin American sample indicates that any micro-level evidence finding in this region is likely to be generalizable among developing countries. Data from LAPOP 2010, which were collected at a time sufficiently close to the collection of the data used in the previous sections (DALP 2008-2009, WVS2005-2008), were used for comparability. The variables of interest were operationalized as follows.

[Figure 12 about here]

Dependent Variable Preference of redistribution was measured using the response to the following statement: *The (Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?* The original response was provided on a 7-point scale, while it was recoded into a binary variable *Strongly Support Redistribution* by setting those who respond 6 or 7 into True and those below 6 into False. It is argued that responses to this statement more accurately capture redistributive preference because they explicitly mention the role of government.

Independent Variables: Income Income was operationalized as the distance of the households approximate monthly income (in USD) from the country median. Respondents were asked to place their monthly income level into an income scale from no income to more than $751, binned into 11 levels. Individual responses were first coded into a real income level, and then they were centered them by the country median. With the reasonable assumption that respondents are uniformly distributed within each bin, respondents income levels were coded as the median value of the two ends of the bin

chosen. For instance, if one chose $51-$100, his income level is coded as $75. Recoding was completed by subtracting the country median from the individuals income level. [8]

Independent Variable: State Capacity Two measures were used for individual evaluation of state capacity. First, individual assessment of state capacity was measured based on whether respondents *trust* their national and local governments, the same as the operationalization in the cross-national study [9]. Second, having acknowledged that confidence and trust in the government are not perfect measures of individual assessment of state capacity, the analyses were supplemented with alternative proxies from a set of questions for which respondents assessed the administrations performance on fighting poverty, promoting democratic principles, combating corruption, safety, unemployment, and managing the economy. [10] It is argued that responses to these questions can serve as proxies of the variable of interest because these are all administrative tasks that require state capacity. Hence, the ratings reveal what respondents believe the state does and can do in a variety of social and economic issues to some extent. It alleviates the noise that the use of the trust measurement causes. That said, they are not perfect proxies because they still do not directly probe evaluation of capacity. In addition, some questions may partly capture how much the respondent is satisfied with the status-quo welfare system; however, it is argued that this potential problem biases the results against the claim. That is, if a respondent expresses his satisfaction with the current welfare system, he will give a high rating in this state capacity measure and demand *less* redistribution. As a result, the drawback of the new measurement will not invalidate any statistical significance found in the results. The empirical models were estimated using both ways of operationalization.

Independent Variable: Clientelism The dataset provides a direct measure regarding whether the respondent has been offered clientelistic benefits: *"In recent years*

[8] As a robustness check, I also used an uncentered income value and income in an original scale, either centered or uncentered. The results do not change.

[9] The response was originally a 7-point scale. I recoded the responses into a binary variable all valid responses > 4 are coded as trust, while the rest as un-trust

[10] Example question: To what extent do you say the current administration is managing the economy well? To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety? See Appendix for details.

and thinking about election campaigns, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something, like a favor, food, or any other benefit or thing in return for your vote or support? Has this happened often, sometimes or never?" Though it does not directly ask whether the respondent accepts such benefits, it is still a much closer proxy than the one used in the cross-national study with WVS. Due to social desirability, it was expected that respondents would underreport the frequency of being offered benefits. That is, a considerable number of respondents who have been involved in clientelistic exchanges may claim that they have not. If it is reasonably assumed that the responses to redistributive preference are not subject to the influence of the psychology behind under-reporting clientelistic exchanges, then the results would be underestimated. That is, a part of the subject treated with clientelistic benefits would identify themselves as the non-treated, thus reducing the treatment effect. As a result, the statistical significance can safely be interpreted as substantially meaningful.

Control Variables The same set of demographics were controlled for as the cross-national study. In addition, three new control variables that are theoretically important but not available in the cross-national dataset, namely *remittance*, *informal sector*, and *crime victim*, were included. The standard set of demographics controlled include age, gender, education, marriage status, number of children, employment, religion, and urban residency. It is worth noting that critically important variables were introduced that could not be controlled for in the cross-national study subject due to data constraints. The first is remittance because the mechanism proposed involves alternative risk-hedging strategies to reduce individuals demand for redistribution implemented by the state. It is important to recognize that there are alternatives other than clientelistic benefits. Remittance is an important source, especially in the sample of Latin American countries. Employment identity as being in the informal sector is also an important control because it determines whether one is a beneficiary of redistribution by the state. Another new control variable introduced is whether the respondent had been a victim of a crime in the past six months. Controlling this variable addresses the theory that individual demand for redistribution is caused by concerns related to externality. In addition to the set of micro-level covariates, GDP per capita and Net Gini Coefficient of the country where the respondents reside were always controlled.

Before analyzing the results, it should be emphasized that only the independent variables of state capacity and clientelism were operated at the micro level due to the small

number of countries. The sample includes 15 Latin American countries, which made the attempt of the statistical inference of macro-level predictors or their interaction terms marginally meaningful given the small size. [11] Though there is no statistical inference from the macro-level state capacity and clientelism variables, they were controlled for in the full models, and they do not affect the results.

Results: State Capacity and Redistributive Preference The results support the hypotheses that state capacity is positively associated with the poors demand for redistribution (SC1) and polarization of redistributive preference among income groups (SC2). As is shown in Table 8, when individual-level perception capacity is operationalized as trust in the government, the results are as predicted by the theory. Individuals trust in their national and local governments predict a higher probability that they will strongly support redistribution, and the coefficients are significant. Also, the coefficient of trust in local government with income is negative, meaning that it has a polarizing effect: when state capacity is perceived to be high, the (negative) correlation between redistributive preference and income is smaller. The change caused by increased state capacity is statistically significant and substantial. Thus, the results provide moderate support for the proposed theory.

Models with the alternative operationalization of state capacity yield the same results. An alternative measure of state capacity was used to address the problem that trust in governments may not be a perfect proxy, as discussed. As explained, a set of questions was conceptualized as the respondents evaluations of state capacity. The model was estimated using three of the most relevant variables: whether the respondents agreed that the state improves citizen safety, manages the economy well, and fights poverty. The first principal component of the set of all six questions was also taken and used as an independent variable for the fourth model [12]. As is shown in Table 9, individual ratings of state capacity with different specifications are always negatively associated with redistributive preference, which strongly supports SC1; however, the polarization

[11] List of countries: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay. Three LAPOP2010 countries are left out: Haiti, Belize, and Guyana, due to lack of macro-level inequality or clientelism data.

[12] Responses to the six questions are highly correlated. Hence, the first component explains 71% of the variation. The loadings of all 6 variables are all negative in the original result. For presentation purposes, I reverse the sign of the StateCap (PC1) before using it as an independent variable so that a higher value means a higher rating of state capacity.

effect is not evident in any of the models, which means higher state capacity by this specification does not make the poor and the rich disagree more on redistribution.

[Table 8, 9 about here]

Results: Clientelism and Redistributive Preference The two hypotheses related to clientelism and redistributive preference are partially supported by the results. As Tables 10 and 11 show, being offered clientelistic benefits is negatively associated with the probability that a respondent strongly demands redistribution across all models. The effect holds after controlling for individual perceptions of state capacity. This supports the hypothesis that the poor demand less redistribution when they receive clientelistic benefits (CL1). The polarization hypothesis (CL2) receives marginal support at best. The interaction term of clientelistic benefit and income is positive as the theory predicts, and the value is substantially large (proportional to the coefficient of Income); however, the confidence intervals always cross zero across all models.

[Table 10, 11 about here]

To conclude the discussion of the evidence from Latin America, it is shown that the presented empirical models estimated with LAPOP 2010 data provide support for the theory. Specifically, the evidence strongly supports the hypotheses that the poor demand more redistribution when they believe state capacity is high (SC1) and when they receive clientelistic benefits (CL1). On the other hand, the polarization hypotheses (SC2 and CL2) receive only limited support. The findings from Latin American public opinion data are almost identical to the findings using World Value Survey data with both macro and micro-level indicators of state capacity and clientelism, including evidence that supports and contradicts the theory. Because the empirical findings cross-validate one another, it can safely be concluded that the inferences and the predictions made are valid and substantively meaningful.

After presenting evidence from Latin American public opinion survey data to support the theory proposed in this paper, all the empirical findings are discussed in the next section.

5 Conclusion

This paper is motivated by the empirical question related to the variations in the poors demand for redistribution among countries, which does not increase based on the level of inequality in their countries. It is argued that the baseline model of redistributive politics fails to explain this for two important reasons: (1) it does not take into account the possibility that in some countries, state capacity is not high enough to convince their citizens that the government is capable of providing social welfare, and (2) it does not consider the prevalence of clientelism in some democracies that can effectively serve as alternative risk-hedging strategies for citizens. This argument is formalized by incorporating a variety of state capacity and clientelism into the baseline materialist model and showing that the extension improves the models ability to explain the empirical pattern. Four hypotheses directly derived from the models comparative statistics were tested: high state capacity is positively associated with demand for redistribution (SC1) and its polarization by income group (SC2); clientelism is negatively associated with demand for redistribution (CL1) and the polarization by income group (CL2).

The empirical tests were structured into multiple layers. The main empirical evidence discussed is based on a cross-national analysis among 42 developed and developing countries. The hypotheses were first tested using aggregated country-level data. Linear models both across a sample of 25 developing countries and an extended sample of 42 countries were tested. The results moderately support the theory. The clearest pattern from the analysis is that the poors demand for redistribution decreases based on the political partys clientelistic effort targeting the poor. Also, polarization of redistributive preferences decreases based on clientelistic effort targeting the poor. The hypothesis that state capacity increases the poors redistributive preference is only marginally supported in some of the models estimated, while the polarization hypothesis of state capacity has very limited support.

The second set of cross-national empirical analyses provides micro-level evidence for these 42 countries. The analysis was executed at three levels. First, whether individuals respond to the political context of state capacity and clientelism as the theory predicts was examined. The results provide fairly strong support. Second, whether an individuals acceptance of clientelistic benefits reduces redistributive demand, given state capacity as context, was examined. The results again support the theory. Finally,

the way individual evaluations of state capacity and acceptance of clientelistic benefits jointly influence redistributive preference was evaluated. The results partly support the theory (CL1 is strongly supported, while results are mixed for the others).

The empirical findings were verified using public opinion data from Latin America (LAPOP2010) to address the problem of construct validity and omitted country-specific variables in the cross-national study. It is argued that the Latin American sample is a relatively representative sample of developing democratic countries given its variety of state capacity and level of clientelism. With greatly improved measures of the variables of interest, a nearly identical pattern is shown as that of the cross-national study. Thus, the validity of the empirical findings can be safely claimed.

To reiterate, the empirical studies discussed in this paper are designed to directly address the macro-level empirical investigation while also testing the micro foundation put forward in the formal model. It is concluded that overall, the empirics moderately support the theory. Specifically, the results strongly support the part of the theory that clientelism or individual acceptance of clientelistic benefits reduces demand for redistribution (CL1). The results also show that in developing countries, an individuals recognition of a high state capacity increases demand for redistribution (SC1). On the other hand, the support for the polarization hypotheses of both state capacity and clientelism is limited. It is argued that the mixed results in the empirical findings can be attributed to the limitations of both the empirical strategy and the theoretical argument of this paper, as is discussed in the final section.

6 Limitation and Future Research

The theory proposed in this paper is generally supported by cross-national and regional empirical findings both at the macro and micro levels; however, the imperfect match of the theory and the empirics is arguably caused by the limitation of the observational empirical strategy adopted and the relatively simple theoretical context that does not sufficiently capture the complexity of the relationship between the variables of interest.

The observational nature of the empirics limits the ability to make a causal identification. The variables of interest, including state capacity, clientelism, inequality, and

development level, are all highly correlated. The high correlation makes it difficult to estimate the marginal effect of any of them based on the others. Parsing the marginal effect with a micro-level analysis was attempted. Individuals evaluations of state capacity and receptions of clientelistic benefits are not independent from their demographics. Moreover, they are highly likely to depend on their incomes, one of the key independent variables. In future phases of this study, multiple strategies will be used to make causal claims regarding how state capacity and clientelism cause changes in redistributive preferences. A close extension with the observational data would be to match the subjects so that the sample is balanced. A survey experiment may be conducted in which respondents are induced to consider state capacity and clientelism when answering questions related to redistributive preferences.

A more fundamental limitation of the study is rooted in the way the role of state capacity and clientelism are theorized. At the current stage of the study, they are assumed to be independent of each other and exogenous in the process of preference formation. This assumption is overly simplified based on real-world politics. Political parties and politicians make strategic decisions regarding the effort they allocate to state building and party institutionalization, and their linkage strategy (clientelistic or programmatic) is based on what they believe their constituencies prefer. The strategic interaction between political parties and citizens ultimately makes state capacity, linkage strategy, and the formation of redistributive preference endogenous. An extended model that addresses this complexity may be able to explain the status quo and to make predictions.

Moving forward, both the empirical strategy and the theoretical argument will be improved. First, the sample will be matched to achieve a better balance to validate the findings from this observational study. Then, a survey experiment with respondents in a developing country will be designed to make a causal claim regarding how the recognition of state weaknesses and the prevalence of clientelistic exchanges alter redistribution preference. Regarding theory building, the formal model presented in this paper will be further developed. The extended model will take into account the strategic interactions of different income groups and political parties to address the complexity and endogeneity.

Figures

Figure 1: Correlation between income and redistributive preferences



Source: World Value Survey (WVS)

Figure 2: Inequality and Resitributive Preference



(a) The Poor's Demand (b) Correlation(Redist. Pref, Income)

Source: WVS, SWIID

Figure 3: State Capacity and Resitributive Preference



(a) Poor (b) Correlation(Redist. Pref, Income)

Source: WVS, WGI

Figure 4: Clientelism and Resitributive Preference



(a) Poor (b) Correlation(Redist. Pref, Income)

Source: DALP, WVS

Figure 5: Clientelism Targeting the Poor and Resitributive Preference



(a) Poor (b) Correlation(Redist. Pref, Income)

Source: DALP, WVS

Figure 6: Correlation Matrix (All countries)



Figure 7: Correlation Matrix (Developing countries)



Figure 8: Country-level Model: Poor's Redistributive Preference
All countries



State Cap Cliente Cliente (Poor)

Source: DALP, WVS, SWIID, WGI, WDI

Figure 9: Country-level Model: Poor's Redistributive Preference
Developing countries



State Cap Cliente Cliente (Poor)

Source: DALP, WVS, SWIID, WGI, WDI

Figure 10: Country-level Model: Polarization of Redistributive Preference
All countries



State Cap Cliente Cliente (Poor)

Source: DALP, WVS, SWIID, WGI, WDI

Figure 11: Country-level Model: Polarization of Redistributive Preference
Developing countries



State Cap Cliente Cliente (Poor)

Source: DALP, WVS, SWIID, WGI, WDI

Figure 12: Position of the LAPOP Sample



Tables

Table 1: [WVS Country-level, All] The Poor's Redistributive Demand (Full)

	Dependent variable:				
	Percentage of the Poor Strongly Supporting Redistribution				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
State Cap (GE)	0.042				0.014
	(−0.040, 0.123)				(−0.069, 0.097)
DALP Cliente (Gen)		−0.012		−0.003	
		(−0.035, 0.010)		(−0.027, 0.021)	
DALP Cliente (Poor)			−0.123**	−0.117*	−0.117*
			(−0.230, −0.016)	(−0.236, 0.001)	(−0.231, −0.002)
Net Gini Coef	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(−0.004, 0.010)	(−0.004, 0.009)	(−0.005, 0.007)	(−0.005, 0.007)	(−0.005, 0.008)
Post Communist	0.063	0.029	0.045	0.043	0.053
	(−0.074, 0.200)	(−0.099, 0.158)	(−0.076, 0.166)	(−0.082, 0.167)	(−0.079, 0.185)
Advanced Capitalist	0.047	0.017	0.065	0.049	0.051
	(−0.110, 0.204)	(−0.172, 0.206)	(−0.059, 0.189)	(−0.136, 0.234)	(−0.100, 0.201)
Constant	0.132	0.364*	0.422**	0.450**	0.388*
	(−0.174, 0.437)	(−0.051, 0.779)	(0.093, 0.751)	(0.041, 0.859)	(0.001, 0.775)
Observations	42	42	42	42	42
R^2	0.081	0.084	0.170	0.171	0.172
Adjusted R^2	−0.019	−0.015	0.080	0.056	0.057
Residual Std. Error	0.139 (df = 37)	0.139 (df = 37)	0.132 (df = 37)	0.134 (df = 36)	0.134 (df = 36)
F Statistic	0.813 (df = 4; 37)	0.848 (df = 4; 37)	1.888 (df = 4; 37)	1.482 (df = 5; 36)	1.497 (df = 5; 36)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: [WVS Country-level, All] Correlation between Redistributive Preference and Income (Full)

	Dependent variable:				
	Correlation (Redistributive Preference, Income)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
State Cap (GE)	−0.012				0.005
	(−0.062, 0.038)				(−0.045, 0.056)
DALP Cliente (Gen)		0.009		0.004	
		(−0.004, 0.023)		(−0.010, 0.019)	
DALP Cliente (Poor)			0.071**	0.062*	0.073**
			(0.006, 0.135)	(−0.009, 0.134)	(0.004, 0.142)
Net Gini Coef	0.003	0.003	0.004**	0.004*	0.004*
	(−0.001, 0.007)	(−0.001, 0.007)	(0.0003, 0.008)	(0.0001, 0.008)	(0.00001, 0.008)
Post Communist	−0.012	0.002	−0.009	−0.005	−0.006
	(−0.095, 0.071)	(−0.075, 0.078)	(−0.082, 0.064)	(−0.080, 0.069)	(−0.086, 0.074)
Advanced Capitalist	−0.037	0.006	−0.034	−0.010	−0.039
	(−0.132, 0.058)	(−0.106, 0.119)	(−0.109, 0.041)	(−0.122, 0.101)	(−0.130, 0.052)
Constant	−0.217**	−0.360***	−0.365***	−0.406***	−0.377***
	(−0.402, −0.031)	(−0.607, −0.114)	(−0.563, −0.166)	(−0.652, −0.160)	(−0.611, −0.143)
Observations	42	42	42	42	42
R^2	0.259	0.289	0.336	0.342	0.337
Adjusted R^2	0.179	0.212	0.265	0.251	0.245
Residual Std. Error	0.084 (df = 37)	0.083 (df = 37)	0.080 (df = 37)	0.081 (df = 36)	0.081 (df = 36)
F Statistic	3.233** (df = 4; 37)	3.757** (df = 4; 37)	4.689*** (df = 4; 37)	3.747*** (df = 5; 36)	3.663*** (df = 5; 36)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
					DV Correlation is negative. So positive coef means a depolarizing effect

Table 3: [WVS Country-level, Developing] The Poor's Redistributive Demand (Full)

	Dependent variable:				
	Percentage of the Poor Strongly Supporting Redistribution				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
State Cap (GE)	0.059				0.045
	(−0.047, 0.166)				(−0.064, 0.154)
DALP Cliente (Gen)		−0.004		0.0002	
		(−0.041, 0.032)		(−0.036, 0.037)	
DALP Cliente (Poor)			−0.089	−0.089	−0.076
			(−0.217, 0.040)	(−0.223, 0.045)	(−0.209, 0.057)
Net Gini Coef	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(−0.006, 0.011)	(−0.007, 0.012)	(−0.008, 0.010)	(−0.008, 0.011)	(−0.008, 0.010)
Post Communist	0.013	−0.008	−0.002	−0.002	0.008
	(−0.140, 0.166)	(−0.177, 0.161)	(−0.151, 0.147)	(−0.168, 0.165)	(−0.144, 0.161)
Advanced Capitalist	0.175	0.251	0.381	0.376	0.354
	(−0.213, 0.563)	(−0.542, 1.045)	(−0.108, 0.869)	(−0.427, 1.180)	(−0.143, 0.850)
Observations	25	25	25	25	25
R^2	0.086	0.036	0.111	0.111	0.140
Adjusted R^2	−0.045	−0.101	−0.016	−0.066	−0.032
Residual Std. Error	0.139 (df = 21)	0.143 (df = 21)	0.137 (df = 21)	0.141 (df = 20)	0.138 (df = 20)
F Statistic	0.658 (df = 3; 21)	0.264 (df = 3; 21)	0.877 (df = 3; 21)	0.627 (df = 4; 20)	0.813 (df = 4; 20)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: [WVS Country-level, Developing] Correlation between Redistributive Preference and Income (Full)

	Dependent variable:				
	Correlation (Redistributive Preference, Income)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
State Cap (GE)	−0.007				0.006
	(−0.088, 0.073)				(−0.074, 0.087)
DALP Cliente (Gen)		0.013		0.010	
		(−0.013, 0.039)		(−0.017, 0.036)	
DALP Cliente (Poor)			0.072	0.066	0.074
			(−0.021, 0.166)	(−0.031, 0.162)	(−0.025, 0.173)
Net Gini Coef	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.003
	(−0.005, 0.008)	(−0.004, 0.009)	(−0.004, 0.009)	(−0.003, 0.010)	(−0.004, 0.009)
Post Communist	−0.019	0.006	−0.016	0.001	−0.015
	(−0.135, 0.096)	(−0.116, 0.128)	(−0.125, 0.092)	(−0.119, 0.121)	(−0.128, 0.098)
Constant	−0.143	−0.387	−0.313*	−0.479	−0.317
	(−0.436, 0.151)	(−0.959, 0.185)	(−0.669, 0.043)	(−1.057, 0.099)	(−0.685, 0.051)
Observations	25	25	25	25	25
R^2	0.033	0.073	0.127	0.149	0.128
Adjusted R^2	−0.105	−0.059	0.002	−0.022	−0.047
Residual Std. Error	0.105 (df = 21)	0.103 (df = 21)	0.100 (df = 21)	0.101 (df = 20)	0.102 (df = 20)
F Statistic	0.240 (df = 3; 21)	0.552 (df = 3; 21)	1.015 (df = 3; 21)	0.874 (df = 4; 20)	0.732 (df = 4; 20)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
					DV Correlation is negative. So positive coef means a depolarizing effect

Table 5: [WVS Cross] Strong Demand for Redistribution

	Dependent variable:					
	Strongly Support Redistribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Poor	0.34***	0.32***	0.55***	1.17***	0.57***	0.58***
	(0.27, 0.40)	(0.25, 0.39)	(0.36, 0.74)	(0.65, 1.69)	(0.37, 0.76)	(0.35, 0.81)
StateCap (GE)	0.10***	0.18				
	(0.02, 0.18)	(−0.04, 0.40)				
DALP Cliente (Gen)			−0.04**	0.26*		
			(−0.07, −0.01)	(−0.05, 0.58)		
DALP Cliente (Poor)					−3.36***	−0.76
					(−5.80, −0.91)	(−1.80, 0.28)
StateCap (GE) × Poor	0.01	−0.02				
	(−0.04, 0.07)	(−0.16, 0.12)				
DALP Cliente (Gen) × Poor			−0.02**	−0.06***		
			(−0.03, −0.002)	(−0.09, −0.02)		
DALP Cliente (Poor) × Poor					−0.15**	−0.17**
					(−0.28, −0.02)	(−0.31, −0.03)
Constant	−1.41***	−1.33***	−0.94***	−5.46**	3.60**	−0.32
	(−1.54, −1.27)	(−1.49, −1.17)	(−1.29, −0.59)	(−10.28, −0.64)	(0.0002, 7.21)	(−1.80, 1.16)
Model	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE
N Countries	42	25	42	25	42	25
Observations	50,406	33,209	50,406	33,209	50,406	33,209
Log Likelihood	−25,420.28	−16,158.33	−25,418.04	−16,153.11	−25,417.78	−16,155.64
Akaike Inf. Crit.	50,948.56	32,392.66	50,944.07	32,382.22	50,943.57	32,387.29

Individual demographics controlled. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: [WVS Individual Clientelism] Strong Demand for Redistribution

	Dependent variable:					
	Strongly Support Redistribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Poor	0.30***	0.30***	0.31***	0.31***	0.32***	0.32***
	(0.23, 0.37)	(0.21, 0.38)	(0.25, 0.38)	(0.23, 0.39)	(0.25, 0.39)	(0.23, 0.41)
StateCap (GE)	0.10**	0.16	0.07*	0.09	0.10**	0.14
	(0.02, 0.17)	(−0.07, 0.38)	(−0.002, 0.15)	(−0.14, 0.31)	(0.02, 0.17)	(−0.09, 0.36)
Cheat tax	−0.21***	−0.18***				
	(−0.26, −0.15)	(−0.25, −0.11)				
Accept Bribe			−0.28***	−0.27***		
			(−0.34, −0.22)	(−0.34, −0.19)		
Claim unentitled benefit					−0.16***	−0.18***
					(−0.21, −0.11)	(−0.25, −0.11)
Cheat tax × Poor	0.11*	0.02				
	(−0.004, 0.21)	(−0.12, 0.16)				
Accept Bribe × Poor			0.06	−0.03		
			(−0.06, 0.18)	(−0.18, 0.12)		
Claim unentitled benefit × Poor					0.04	−0.05
					(−0.07, 0.15)	(−0.18, 0.09)
Constant	−1.31***	−1.25***	−1.27***	−1.25***	−1.34***	−1.26***
	(−1.45, −1.17)	(−1.42, −1.08)	(−1.41, −1.14)	(−1.42, −1.08)	(−1.47, −1.20)	(−1.43, −1.09)
Model	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE
N Countries	42	25	42	25	42	25
Observations	48,058	30,988	48,220	31,143	47,910	30,924
Log Likelihood	−24,312.31	−15,143.41	−24,398.86	−15,225.59	−24,214.30	−15,089.80
Akaike Inf. Crit.	48,732.62	30,362.82	48,905.72	30,527.18	48,536.60	30,255.60

Individual demographics controlled. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: [WVS Individual Cliente and Confidence on Gov] Strong Demand for Redistribution

	Dependent variable:					
	Strongly Support Redistribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Poor	0.30***	0.30***	0.32***	0.31***	0.33***	0.35***
	(0.21, 0.39)	(0.18, 0.43)	(0.24, 0.40)	(0.20, 0.43)	(0.24, 0.42)	(0.22, 0.47)
StateCap (GE)	0.09**	0.13	0.06	0.05	0.08**	0.10
	(0.01, 0.16)	(−0.11, 0.36)	(−0.01, 0.14)	(−0.18, 0.28)	(0.01, 0.16)	(−0.14, 0.33)
Confidence on Gov	−0.09***	0.01	−0.09***	0.01	−0.09***	0.01
	(−0.15, −0.04)	(−0.06, 0.08)	(−0.14, −0.03)	(−0.06, 0.07)	(−0.14, −0.03)	(−0.06, 0.08)
Cheat tax	−0.24***	−0.22***				
	(−0.29, −0.18)	(−0.29, −0.15)				
Accept Bribe			−0.30***	−0.29***		
			(−0.36, −0.24)	(−0.37, −0.22)		
Claim unentitled benefit					−0.17***	−0.20***
					(−0.23, −0.12)	(−0.27, −0.13)
Confidence on Gov × Poor	0.01	0.04	0.002	0.04	0.0004	0.03
	(−0.10, 0.12)	(−0.10, 0.18)	(−0.11, 0.11)	(−0.10, 0.18)	(−0.11, 0.11)	(−0.11, 0.17)
Cheat tax × Poor	0.10*	−0.01				
	(−0.01, 0.22)	(−0.16, 0.14)				
Accept Bribe × Poor			0.06	−0.06		
			(−0.07, 0.18)	(−0.22, 0.09)		
Claim unentitled benefit × Poor					0.02	−0.12
					(−0.09, 0.13)	(−0.26, 0.03)
Constant	−1.24***	−1.21***	−1.22***	−1.23***	−1.28***	−1.24***
	(−1.38, −1.10)	(−1.39, −1.04)	(−1.36, −1.08)	(−1.40, −1.06)	(−1.42, −1.14)	(−1.42, −1.07)
Model	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE
N Countries	42	25	42	25	42	25
Observations	43,863	27,116	43,998	27,247	43,743	27,071
Log Likelihood	−22,375.85	−13,391.95	−22,447.93	−13,460.16	−22,301.00	−13,355.20
Akaike Inf. Crit.	44,861.70	26,861.90	45,005.85	26,998.32	44,712.00	26,788.39

Individual demographics controlled. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: [LAPOP] Strong Demand for Redistribution and State Capacity

	Dependent variable:		
	Strongly Support Redistribution		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\text{Income}_{v,c}$	-0.001^{***}	-0.0004^{**}	-0.0004^{**}
	$(-0.001, -0.0002)$	$(-0.001, -0.0000)$	$(-0.001, -0.0001)$
$\text{StateCap}_{nat,b}$	0.28^{***}		0.23^{***}
	(0.21, 0.34)		(0.16, 0.29)
$\text{StateCap}_{loc,b}$		0.23^{***}	0.17^{***}
		(0.17, 0.29)	(0.10, 0.23)
$\text{StateCap}_{nat,b} \times \text{Income}_{v,c}$	-0.0000		0.0001
	$(-0.0005, 0.0004)$		$(-0.0003, 0.001)$
$\text{StateCap}_{loc,b} \times \text{Income}_{v,c}$		-0.0005^{**}	-0.0005^{**}
		$(-0.001, -0.0000)$	$(-0.001, -0.0000)$
log(GDPpc)	1.26^{***}	1.34^{***}	1.27^{***}
	(0.97, 1.55)	(1.05, 1.63)	(0.98, 1.57)
Constant	-8.31^{***}	-8.51^{***}	-8.52^{***}
	$(-10.17, -6.45)$	$(-10.37, -6.64)$	$(-10.39, -6.65)$
Model	Logit FE	Logit FE	Logit FE
N Countries	15	15	15
Observations	21,381	21,403	21,158
Log Likelihood	$-12{,}951.87$	$-12{,}989.52$	$-12{,}812.62$
Akaike Inf. Crit.	25,969.73	26,045.05	25,695.24

Individual demographics controlled. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: [LAPOP] Strong Demand for Redistribution and State Capacity

	Dependent variable:			
	Strongly Support Redistribution			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\text{Income}_{v,c}$	-0.0005^{***} $(-0.001, -0.0002)$	-0.001^{***} $(-0.001, -0.0002)$	-0.0005^{***} $(-0.001, -0.0002)$	-0.0005^{***} $(-0.001, -0.0002)$
StateCap_b (safety)	0.26^{***} (0.19, 0.33)			
StateCap_b (ManageEcon)		0.29^{***} (0.22, 0.36)		
StateCap_b (FightPoverty)			0.24^{***} (0.18, 0.31)	
StateCap (PC1)				0.03^{***} (0.01, 0.05)
StateCap_b (safety) $\times$ $\text{Income}_{v,c}$	0.0000 $(-0.0005, 0.0005)$			
StateCap_b (ManageEcon) $\times$ $\text{Income}_{v,c}$		0.0002 $(-0.0003, 0.001)$		
StateCap_b (FightPoverty) $\times$ $\text{Income}_{v,c}$			-0.0000 $(-0.0005, 0.0005)$	
StateCap (PC1) $\times$ $\text{Income}_{v,c}$				0.0000 $(-0.0001, 0.0001)$
log(GDPpc)	1.33^{***} (1.02, 1.63)	1.18^{***} (0.87, 1.48)	1.25^{***} (0.95, 1.56)	1.27^{***} (0.96, 1.57)
Constant	-8.42^{***} $(-10.32, -6.51)$	-7.50^{***} $(-9.40, -5.59)$	-7.73^{***} $(-9.63, -5.83)$	-7.80^{***} $(-9.70, -5.90)$
Model	Logit FE	Logit FE	Logit FE	Logit FE
N Countries	15	15	15	15
Observations	20,019	20,019	20,019	20,019
Log Likelihood	$-12{,}206.25$	$-12{,}199.06$	$-12{,}209.85$	$-12{,}229.72$
Akaike Inf. Crit.	24,478.51	24,464.11	24,485.70	24,525.43

Individual demographics controlled. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: [LAPOP] Strong Demand for Redistribution and Clientelism

	Dependent variable:			
	Strongly Support Redistribution			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Income$_{v,c}$	-0.001^{***}	-0.001^{***}	-0.0004^{**}	-0.0004^{**}
	$(-0.001, -0.0003)$	$(-0.001, -0.0002)$	$(-0.001, -0.0000)$	$(-0.001, -0.0001)$
Offered Cliente Benefit	-0.10^{**}	-0.09^{*}	-0.09^{*}	-0.09^{*}
	$(-0.19, -0.002)$	$(-0.19, 0.01)$	$(-0.19, 0.003)$	$(-0.18, 0.01)$
StateCap$_{nat,b}$		0.28^{***}		0.23^{***}
		(0.21, 0.34)		(0.16, 0.29)
StateCap$_{loc,b}$			0.23^{***}	0.16^{***}
			(0.17, 0.29)	(0.10, 0.23)
Offered Cliente Benefit $\times$ Income$_{v,c}$	0.0002	0.0003	0.0002	0.0002
	$(-0.0005, 0.001)$	$(-0.0004, 0.001)$	$(-0.0005, 0.001)$	$(-0.0005, 0.001)$
StateCap$_{nat,b}$ $\times$ Income$_{v,c}$		-0.0000		0.0001
		$(-0.0005, 0.0004)$		$(-0.0003, 0.001)$
StateCap$_{loc,b}$ $\times$ Income$_{v,c}$			-0.0005^{**}	-0.0005^{**}
			$(-0.001, -0.0000)$	$(-0.001, -0.0000)$
log(GDPpc)	1.33^{***}	1.26^{***}	1.34^{***}	1.27^{***}
	(1.04, 1.61)	(0.97, 1.55)	(1.05, 1.63)	(0.98, 1.56)
Constant	-8.13^{***}	-8.34^{***}	-8.53^{***}	-8.54^{***}
	$(-9.97, -6.28)$	$(-10.20, -6.48)$	$(-10.39, -6.67)$	$(-10.41, -6.67)$
Model	Logit FE	Logit FE	Logit FE	Logit FE
N Countries	15	15	15	15
Observations	21,705	21,381	21,403	21,158
Log Likelihood	$-13,193.05$	$-12,950.13$	$-12,987.73$	$-12,811.03$
Akaike Inf. Crit.	26,452.09	25,970.27	26,045.45	25,696.07

Individual demographics controlled. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: [LAPOP] Strong Demand for Redistribution and Clientelism

	Dependent variable:			
	Strongly Support Redistribution			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Income$_{v,c}$	−0.0003	−0.001***	−0.001**	−0.001***
	(−0.001, 0.0002)	(−0.001, −0.0002)	(−0.001, −0.0001)	(−0.001, −0.0002)
Offered Cliente Benefit	−0.10*	−0.10*	−0.10*	−0.10*
	(−0.20, 0.0004)	(−0.19, 0.001)	(−0.19, 0.001)	(−0.20, 0.001)
StateCap (safety)	0.04***			
	(0.02, 0.05)			
StateCap (ManageEcon)		0.04***		
		(0.02, 0.06)		
StateCap (FightPoverty)			0.03***	
			(0.01, 0.05)	
StateCap (PC1)				0.03***
				(0.01, 0.05)
Offered Cliente Benefit × Income$_{v,c}$	0.0003	0.0003	0.0003	0.0003
	(−0.0004, 0.001)	(−0.0004, 0.001)	(−0.0004, 0.001)	(−0.0004, 0.001)
StateCap (safety) × Income$_{v,c}$	−0.0000			
	(−0.0002, 0.0001)			
StateCap (ManageEcon) × Income$_{v,c}$		0.0001		
		(−0.0001, 0.0002)		
StateCap (FightPoverty) × Income$_{v,c}$			0.0000	
			(−0.0001, 0.0002)	
StateCap (PC1) × Income$_{v,c}$				0.0000
				(−0.0001, 0.0001)
log(GDPpc)	1.33***	1.24***	1.29***	1.26***
	(1.02, 1.63)	(0.93, 1.54)	(0.99, 1.60)	(0.96, 1.57)
Constant	−8.29***	−7.78***	−7.95***	−7.83***
	(−10.20, −6.39)	(−9.68, −5.88)	(−9.85, −6.05)	(−9.74, −5.93)
Model	Logit FE	Logit FE	Logit FE	Logit FE
N Countries	15	15	15	15
Observations	20,019	20,019	20,019	20,019
Log Likelihood	−12,228.15	−12,225.23	−12,230.11	−12,227.81
Akaike Inf. Crit.	24,526.31	24,520.47	24,530.22	24,525.61

Individual demographics controlled. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Appendix

A Model

I formalize the theory with a simple extension of the Meltzer and Richards model of redistributive preference. This model differs from the baseline model and existing extensions in that individuals' utility from social welfare depend on state capacity, clientelistic political mobilization and organizational capacity of political parties. The section consists of three parts. I will first introduce he setup of the model, specifying the players, their utility functions and optimization problems. In the second part, I construct two indicators of interests. Then I derive the comparative statics and the hypotheses coming out of them.

A.1 Setup

In this part, I introduce the players in the models and their optimization problems. The simplified world depicted by this model has two players, the rich (R) who account for a proportion of $\lambda \in (0.5, 1)$ of the population, and the poor (P) who accounts for a proportion of $(1 - \lambda)$ of the population[13]. The rich and the poor earn pre-tax incomes α_R and α_P respectively, where $\alpha_R > \alpha_P$. Both groups are imposed a flat tax rate t and can vote for a lump sum transfer from programmatic redistribution c. The political parties provide clientelistic goods b_R to the rich, and b_P to the poor. A greater amount of clientelistic good is delivered to the poor than to the rich, that is $b_P > b_R$. The sum of programmatic social policies and clientelistic goods provided is subject to a budget constraint of total tax collected. I consider the delivery of both clientelistic benefit and programmatic social policies as "leaky baskets". That is, only a proportion of the effort/ expenditure arrives at the hand of citizens. As a result, the utility of individuals from redistribution and clientelistic exchange will also be affected by state capacity and organizational capacity of political parties. In this model $\theta_b \in (0, 1)$ indicates the organizational capacity of political parties, while the proportion of redistribution expenditure citizens ultimately receive $\theta_c \in (0, 1)$ indicates state capacity. With the

[13]This means the poor in a country always outnumber the rich, which is a reasonable assumption adopted by a number of political economy models of distributive politics.

above input, as the variables of interest in this model, the rich and the poor demand a lump sum transfer from programmatic social policies c_R and c_P respectively. The setup is formalized as two optimization problems of the poor and the rich respectively.

$$\begin{aligned}
&\text{(The Rich's Problem)} && \max_{c_R} u_R = \alpha_R(1-t) + v(c|b_R, \theta_b, \theta_c) - \frac{t^2}{2} \\
&\text{(The Poor's Problem)} && \max_{c_P} u_P = \alpha_P(1-t) + v(c|b_P, \theta_b, \theta_c) - \frac{t^2}{2} \\
&\text{(Budget Constraint)} && \bar{\alpha}t = \bar{b} + c \qquad \text{where} \quad \bar{b} = \lambda b_P + (1-\lambda) b_R
\end{aligned}$$

In this model, the rich and the poor are all self-interested individuals whose utility functions have three components: (1) post-tax income α_R and α_P; (2) utility gain from programmatic social that which depends on clientelistic goods they have received, state capacity, and organizational capacity of political parties $v(c|b_R, \theta_b, \theta_c)$ and $v(c|b_P, \theta_b, \theta_c)$; (3) and deadweight loss caused by taxation, $\frac{t^2}{2}$.

The second component of the utility function, as the part of interest in this paper, is worth further specification. I will first characterize its first and second order partial derivatives and then specify a simplified function for this paper. First, the partial derivates of $v(.)$ as follows:

$$\frac{\partial v}{\partial c} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 v}{\partial c \partial \theta_c} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 v}{\partial c \partial b_i} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 v}{\partial c \partial \theta_b} < 0 \qquad \text{where } i \in \{R, P\}$$

The four first and second order derivatives capture the following intuitions: (1) The utility from programmatic redistribution increases with regards to expenditure on programmatic redistribution c. (2) The *marginal* utility from programmatic redistribution increases with bureaucratic capacities θ_c, because strong states can more efficiently deliver the programmatic goods to individuals, increasing the individuals' marginal gain from each unit of redistribution expenditure. (3) The marginal utility from programmatic redistribution decreases with clientelistic effort (b_R for the rich and b_P for the poor), because clientelistic goods substitute for programmatic social policies in risk-hedging. (4) The marginal utility from programmatic redistribution decreases with organizational capacity of political parties (θ_b), because higher organizational capacity of political parties help efficiently turn clientelistic $effort$ into clientelistic goods citizens received.

For simplicity, without losing the general explanatory power of this model, I specify the utility gain from transfers in the following form:

$$v(b_i, c) = \theta \frac{c}{b_i} \qquad \text{where} \quad \theta = \frac{\theta_c}{\theta_b} \text{ and } i \in \{R, P\}$$

Note that I use θ to denote the *relative* capacity of bureaucracy and party organizations. This parameter will be used in the first and second comparative statics for simplicity of notation.

A.2 The Two Indicators of Interest

Solving the optimization problems of the rich and the poor, their demand for programmatic redistribution are:

$$c_P^* = -\alpha_P \bar{\alpha} + \frac{\theta}{b_P} \bar{\alpha}^2 - \bar{b}$$
$$c_R^* = -\alpha_R \bar{\alpha} + \frac{\theta}{b_R} \bar{\alpha}^2 - \bar{b}$$

The average demand for redistribution in the country (C_m) and polarization of redistribution demand between the rich and the poor (C_{po}) are defined as follows:

$$\text{(Average Demand)} \quad C_m^* = \lambda c_P^* + (1 - \lambda) c_R^*$$
$$\text{(Polarization of Demand)} \quad C_{po}^* = \lambda c_P^* - (1 - \lambda) c_R^*$$

Then the average demand of redistribution is:

$$\begin{aligned} C_m^* &= -\bar{\alpha}^2 + \theta \left(\frac{\lambda}{b_P} + \frac{1 - \lambda}{b_R}\right) \bar{\alpha}^2 - \bar{b} \\ &= -\bar{\alpha}^2 + \theta \left(\frac{\lambda}{b_P} + \frac{1}{\bar{b} - \lambda b_P}\right) \bar{\alpha}^2 - \bar{b} \end{aligned}$$

The polarization of redistribution demand between the poor and the rich is:

$$\begin{aligned} C_{po}^* &= [(1 - \lambda)\alpha_R - \lambda \alpha_P] \bar{\alpha} + \theta \left(\frac{\lambda}{b_P} - \frac{1 - \lambda}{b_R}\right) \alpha^2 - (2\lambda - 1) \bar{b} \\ &= [(1 - \lambda)\alpha_R - \lambda \alpha_P] \bar{\alpha} + \theta \left(\frac{\lambda}{b_P} - \frac{1}{\bar{b} - \lambda b_P}\right) \bar{\alpha}^2 - (2\lambda - 1) \bar{b} \end{aligned}$$

A.3 Comparative Statics and Hypotheses

In this part I derive six comparative statics and generate empirically testable hypotheses out of each of them. The first two comparative statics concern how state capacity is associated with demand for redistribution. The third and the fourth investigate the relationship between clientelism and redistribution demand. The last two examine how the organizational capacity of political parties is associated with the polarization and average of redistribution demand.

A.3.1 State Capacity and Social Policy Demand

Two comparative statics about the change of average demand for redistribution with regards to state capacity and the organizational capacity of political parties are as follows:

$$\text{(CS1)} \qquad \frac{\partial C_m^*}{\partial \theta_c} = \frac{1}{\theta_b}\left(\frac{\lambda}{b_P} + \frac{1}{\bar{b} - \lambda b_P}\right)\bar{\alpha}^2 > 0$$

$$\text{(CS2)} \qquad \frac{\partial C_{po}^*}{\partial \theta_c} = \frac{1}{\theta_b}\left(\frac{\lambda}{b_P} - \frac{1}{\bar{b} - \lambda b_P}\right)\bar{\alpha}^2$$

The condition under which the demand for redistribution polarizes between the rich and the poor as state capacity increases ($\frac{\partial C_{po}^*}{\partial \theta_c} > 0$) is:

$$b_P < \frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda^2}\bar{b} \quad \text{or} \quad b_p < \frac{\lambda}{1-\lambda} b_R$$

The intuitive interpretation of this condition is that high state capacity polarizes redistribution demand only when clientelistic goods delivered to the poor is not overwhelmingly high such that the rich will be more in favor of programmatic redistribution than the poor does. This counter-intuitive situation, I argue, is rare, because in few intermediate-income country as far as I am concerned does the political parties deliver an excessive amount of clientelistic goods to the poor which leads to the consequences that the rich demand more social policies than the poor. These two final comparative statics lead to the following two final hypotheses:

The two comparative statics leads to the following two hypotheses:

H1 from CS1 The average demand for redistribution increases as state capacity in-

creases.

H2 from CS2 The rich-poor polarization of redistribution demand increases as state capacity increases, if the amount of clientelistic goods offered to the poor is not overwhelmingly high such that the rich demand more redistribution than the poor.

A.3.2 Clientelism and Social Policy Demand

The following two comparative statics concerns the relationship between clientelism and redistribution demand.

$$\text{(CS3)} \qquad \frac{\partial C_m^*}{\partial \bar{b}} = -\frac{\theta \bar{\alpha}^2}{(\bar{b} - \lambda b_P)^2} - 1 < 0$$

$$\text{(CS4)} \qquad \frac{\partial C_{po}^*}{\partial \bar{b}} = \frac{\theta \bar{\alpha}^2}{(\bar{b} - \lambda b_P)^2} - (2\lambda - 1)$$

The third comparative statistic (CS3) shows that the FOC of C_m^* with regards to $\bar{b}$ is always negative, hence generating the hypothesis below.

H3 from CS3 The average demand for redistribution always decreases as the average level of clientelistic effort increases.

The fourth comparative static (CS4) shows that the sign of the FOC of C_{po}^* with regards to $\bar{b}$ depends on the relative size of $\frac{\theta \bar{\alpha}^2}{(\bar{b} - \lambda b_P)^2}$ and $(2\lambda - 1)$. As is noted at the setup of the model, $\lambda \in (0.5, 1)$, then $2\lambda - 1 > 0$. Then clientelistic effort de-polarize the redistribution demand between the rich and the poor only under the following condition:

$$\frac{\partial C_{po}^*}{\partial \bar{b}} < 0$$

$$\frac{\theta \bar{\alpha}^2}{(\bar{b} - \lambda b_P)^2} - (2\lambda - 1) < 0$$

$$b_P > \left(\bar{b} - \sqrt{\frac{\theta}{2\lambda - 1}} \bar{\alpha} \right) / \lambda$$

Substantively, the provision of clientelistic exchange de-polarizes redistribution demand between the rich and the poor only when the clientelistic goods provided to the poor is sufficiently high. This leads to the second hypothesis:

H4 from CS4 The demand for redistribution de-polarizes as the overall clientelistic effort increases, under the condition that the amount of clientelistic goods provided to the poor is sufficiently large.

A.3.3 Party Capacity and Social Policy Demand

The following two comparative statics regards the organizational capacity of political parties.

$$\text{(CS5)} \qquad \frac{\partial C_m^*}{\partial \theta_b} = -\frac{\theta_c}{\theta_b^2}\left(\frac{\lambda}{b_P} + \frac{1}{\bar{b} - \lambda b_P}\right)\bar{\alpha}^2 < 0$$

$$\text{(CS6)} \qquad \frac{\partial C_{po}^*}{\partial \theta_b} = -\frac{\theta_c}{\theta_b^2}\left(\frac{\lambda}{b_P} - \frac{1}{\bar{b} - \lambda b_P}\right)\bar{\alpha}^2$$

The condition under which high organizational capacity of political parties de-polarize demand for redistribution ($\frac{\partial C_{po}^*}{\partial \theta_b} < 0$) is:

$$b_P < \frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda^2}\bar{b} \quad \text{or} \quad b_p < \frac{\lambda}{1-\lambda} b_R$$

The above condition has the same substantive interpretation as that of the relationship between state capacity and redistribution demand. That is, high organizational capacity of parties de-polarizes redistribution demand between the rich and the poor when clientelistic goods delivered to the poor is not overwhelmingly high such that the rich will be more in favor of programmatic redistribution than the poor does. As aforementioned, the scenario violating this condition is rare.

H5 from CS5 The average demand for redistribution decreases as the organizational capacity of political parties increases.

H6 from CS6 The demand for redistribution de-polarizes as the organizational capacity of political parties increases, if the level of clientelistic goods offered to the poor is not overwhelmingly high such that the rich demand more redistribution than the poor.

B List of Variables

Table 12: List of Variables

Variable	Formal Model	Source	Description
Demand for social policy	c_P, c_R	WVS	(Survey question) [1] People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves ... [10] Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. *(recoded by the author)*
Average clientelistic effort	$\bar{b}$	DALP	(Expert survey question) Consider whether candidates and parties give or promise to give citizens: consumer goods, material advantages in public social policy schemes, preferential access to employment in the public sector or in the publicly regulated private sector, preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities, influence the application of regulatory rules issued by government agencies [1] A negligible effort or none at all; [2] A minor effort; [3] A moderate effort; [4] A major effort
Clientelistic benefit to the Poor	b_P	DALP	(Expert survey question) Do political parties make special efforts to attract members of one or several of the following groups with such inducements? [1] Rich voters; [2] Middle income voters; [3] Poor voters *(recoded by the author)*
State capacity	θ_c	WGI	Government Effectiveness Index from World Government Indicators. Average of 2000s is taken.
Organizational capacity of political parties (formal)	θ_b	DALP	(Expert survey question) Do the following parties or their individual candidates maintain offices and paid staff at the local or municipal-level? If yes, are these offices and staff permanent or only during national elections? [1] No, the party does not maintain local offices ; [2] Yes, the party maintains local offices, but only during national elections; [3] Yes, the party maintains permanent local offices in SOME districts; [4] Yes, the party maintains permanent local offices in MOST districts *(recoded by the author)*
Organizational capacity of political parties (informal)	θ_b	DALP	(Expert survey question) Do the following parties have local intermediaries (e.g. neighborhood leaders, local notables, religious leaders) who operate in local constituencies on the parties? behalf, and perform a variety of important tasks such as maintaining contact with large groups of voters, organizing electoral support and voter turnout, and distributing party resources to voters and supporters? [1] No, they have almost no local representatives; [2] Yes, they have local representatives in SOME constituencies; [3] Yes, they have local representatives in MOST constituencies *(recoded by the author)*
Inequality	λ	SWIID	Average of Market Gini Coefficient in the 2000s

Table 13: List of Variables from LAPOP

Variable	Source	Description
Redistributive Preference	LAPOP2010	ROS4. The (Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
Income	LAPOP2010	Q10. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children? [If the interviewee does not get it, ask: Which is the total monthly income in your household?] [10 deciles based on the currency and distribution of the country] (00) No income (01) Less than $25 (02) $26- $50 (03) $51-$100 (04) $101-$150 (05) $151-$200 (06) $201-$300 (07) $301-$400 (08) $401-500 (09) $501-$750 (10) More than $751 (88) DK (98) DA
State Capacity: Trust National Government	LAPOP2010	B14. To what extent do you trust the national government?
State Capacity: Trust Local Government	LAPOP2010	B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?
State Capacity: Performance	LAPOP2010	N1. To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty? N3. To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles? N9. To what extent would you say the current administration combats government corruption? N11. To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety? N12. To what extent would you say the current administration combats unemployment? N15. To what extent would you say that the current administration is managing the economy well?
Clientelism: Offered clientelistic benefit	LAPOP2010	CLIEN1. In recent years and thinking about election campaigns, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something, like a favor, food, or any other benefit or thing in return for your vote or support? Has this happened often, sometimes or never? (1) Often [Continue with CLIEN2] (2) Sometimes [Continue with CLIEN2] (3) Never [Skip to ED] (88) DK[Skip to ED] (98) DA [Skip to ED]
Remittances	LAPOP2010	Q10A. Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances, that is, economic assistance from abroad? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to Q10C] (88) DK[Go to Q10C] (98) DA [Go to Q10C]

C Full Empirical Results

C.1 Cross-national Study with WVS

Table 14: [WVS Cross] Strong Demand for Redistribution

	Dependent variable:					
	Strongly Support Redistribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Poor	0.34^{***}	0.32^{***}	0.55^{***}	1.17^{***}	0.57^{***}	0.58^{***}
	(0.27, 0.40)	(0.25, 0.39)	(0.36, 0.74)	(0.65, 1.69)	(0.37, 0.76)	(0.35, 0.81)
StateCap (GE)	0.10^{***}	0.18				
	(0.02, 0.18)	(−0.04, 0.40)				
DALP Cliente (Gen)			-0.04^{**}	0.26^{*}		
			(−0.07, −0.01)	(−0.05, 0.58)		
DALP Cliente (Poor)					-3.36^{***}	−0.76
					(−5.80, −0.91)	(−1.80, 0.28)
StateCap (GE) × Poor	0.01	−0.02				
	(−0.04, 0.07)	(−0.16, 0.12)				
DALP Cliente (Gen) × Poor			-0.02^{**}	-0.06^{***}		
			(−0.03, −0.002)	(−0.09, −0.02)		
DALP Cliente (Poor) × Poor					-0.15^{**}	-0.17^{**}
					(−0.28, −0.02)	(−0.31, −0.03)
Age_s	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
	(−0.01, 0.06)	(−0.02, 0.07)	(−0.01, 0.06)	(−0.02, 0.07)	(−0.01, 0.06)	(−0.02, 0.07)
Age_s^2	-0.03^{**}	0.002	-0.03^{**}	0.002	-0.03^{**}	0.002
	(−0.05, −0.003)	(−0.03, 0.03)	(−0.05, −0.004)	(−0.03, 0.03)	(−0.05, −0.003)	(−0.03, 0.03)
Female	0.13^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.13^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.13^{***}	0.10^{***}
	(0.08, 0.17)	(0.05, 0.16)	(0.08, 0.17)	(0.05, 0.16)	(0.08, 0.17)	(0.05, 0.16)
Edu (below primary)	0.29^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.30^{***}	0.28^{***}	0.29^{***}	0.27^{***}
	(0.22, 0.36)	(0.19, 0.35)	(0.22, 0.37)	(0.19, 0.36)	(0.22, 0.37)	(0.19, 0.35)
Edu (primary)	0.27^{***}	0.28^{***}	0.28^{***}	0.28^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.28^{***}
	(0.21, 0.34)	(0.19, 0.37)	(0.21, 0.34)	(0.19, 0.37)	(0.20, 0.34)	(0.19, 0.36)
Edu (University)	-0.28^{***}	-0.34^{***}	-0.28^{***}	-0.34^{***}	-0.28^{***}	-0.34^{***}
	(−0.34, −0.22)	(−0.42, −0.26)	(−0.34, −0.22)	(−0.43, −0.26)	(−0.34, −0.22)	(−0.42, −0.26)
Married	-0.08^{***}	−0.04	-0.07^{***}	−0.03	-0.07^{***}	−0.04
	(−0.13, −0.02)	(−0.11, 0.03)	(−0.12, −0.02)	(−0.10, 0.04)	(−0.13, −0.02)	(−0.11, 0.03)
Have children	−0.05	−0.06	−0.05	−0.06	−0.05	−0.06
	(−0.12, 0.01)	(−0.15, 0.02)	(−0.12, 0.01)	(−0.15, 0.02)	(−0.12, 0.01)	(−0.15, 0.02)
Weekly religions practice	0.01	0.02	0.005	0.02	0.005	0.02
	(−0.05, 0.06)	(−0.05, 0.08)	(−0.05, 0.06)	(−0.05, 0.08)	(−0.05, 0.06)	(−0.05, 0.08)
Unemployed	0.09^{**}	−0.02	0.08^{**}	−0.02	0.09^{**}	−0.01
	(0.01, 0.16)	(−0.11, 0.08)	(0.01, 0.16)	(−0.11, 0.07)	(0.01, 0.16)	(−0.10, 0.08)
Student	0.01	−0.02	0.01	−0.02	0.01	−0.02
	(−0.08, 0.11)	(−0.13, 0.10)	(−0.09, 0.11)	(−0.13, 0.10)	(−0.08, 0.11)	(−0.13, 0.10)
Retired/ on pension	0.13^{***}	0.18^{***}	0.13^{***}	0.18^{***}	0.13^{***}	0.18^{***}
	(0.05, 0.22)	(0.07, 0.29)	(0.05, 0.21)	(0.07, 0.28)	(0.05, 0.22)	(0.07, 0.29)
Constant	-1.41^{***}	-1.33^{***}	-0.94^{***}	-5.46^{**}	3.60^{**}	−0.32
	(−1.54, −1.27)	(−1.49, −1.17)	(−1.29, −0.59)	(−10.28, −0.64)	(0.0002, 7.21)	(−1.80, 1.16)
Model	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE
N Countries	42	25	42	25	42	25
Observations	50,406	33,209	50,406	33,209	50,406	33,209
Log Likelihood	−25,420.28	−16,158.33	−25,418.04	−16,153.11	−25,417.78	−16,155.64
Akaike Inf. Crit.	50,948.56	32,392.66	50,944.07	32,382.22	50,943.57	32,387.29

Individual demographics controlled. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: [WVS Individual Clientelism] Strong Demand for Redistribution

	Dependent variable:					
	Strongly Support Redistribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Poor	0.30^{***}	0.30^{***}	0.31^{***}	0.31^{***}	0.32^{***}	0.32^{***}
	(0.23, 0.37)	(0.21, 0.38)	(0.25, 0.38)	(0.23, 0.39)	(0.25, 0.39)	(0.23, 0.41)
StateCap (GE)	0.10^{**}	0.16	0.07^{*}	0.09	0.10^{**}	0.14
	(0.02, 0.17)	(-0.07, 0.38)	(-0.002, 0.15)	(-0.14, 0.31)	(0.02, 0.17)	(-0.09, 0.36)
Cheat tax	-0.21^{***}	-0.18^{***}				
	(-0.26, -0.15)	(-0.25, -0.11)				
Accept Bribe			-0.28^{***}	-0.27^{***}		
			(-0.34, -0.22)	(-0.34, -0.19)		
Claim unentitled benefit					-0.16^{***}	-0.18^{***}
					(-0.21, -0.11)	(-0.25, -0.11)
Cheat tax $\times$ Poor	0.11^{*}	0.02				
	(-0.004, 0.21)	(-0.12, 0.16)				
Accept Bribe $\times$ Poor			0.06	-0.03		
			(-0.06, 0.18)	(-0.18, 0.12)		
Claim unentitled benefit $\times$ Poor					0.04	-0.05
					(-0.07, 0.15)	(-0.18, 0.09)
Age_s	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(-0.01, 0.07)	(-0.01, 0.08)	(-0.01, 0.06)	(-0.02, 0.07)	(-0.01, 0.06)	(-0.01, 0.08)
Age_s^2	-0.03^{**}	-0.005	-0.03^{**}	-0.005	-0.03^{**}	-0.003
	(-0.06, -0.01)	(-0.04, 0.03)	(-0.06, -0.01)	(-0.04, 0.03)	(-0.06, -0.01)	(-0.04, 0.03)
Female	0.12^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.12^{***}	0.09^{***}	0.13^{***}	0.10^{***}
	(0.08, 0.17)	(0.04, 0.16)	(0.08, 0.17)	(0.04, 0.15)	(0.08, 0.17)	(0.04, 0.16)
Edu (below primary)	0.27^{***}	0.25^{***}	0.30^{***}	0.28^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.25^{***}
	(0.19, 0.35)	(0.16, 0.33)	(0.22, 0.37)	(0.19, 0.36)	(0.19, 0.34)	(0.16, 0.33)
Edu (primary)	0.26^{***}	0.25^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.28^{***}	0.26^{***}	0.26^{***}
	(0.19, 0.33)	(0.16, 0.35)	(0.20, 0.34)	(0.18, 0.37)	(0.19, 0.33)	(0.17, 0.36)
Edu (University)	-0.27^{***}	-0.33^{***}	-0.29^{***}	-0.33^{***}	-0.28^{***}	-0.33^{***}
	(-0.33, -0.21)	(-0.41, -0.24)	(-0.35, -0.22)	(-0.42, -0.25)	(-0.34, -0.22)	(-0.42, -0.25)
Married	-0.07^{***}	-0.03	-0.08^{***}	-0.03	-0.07^{***}	-0.03
	(-0.13, -0.02)	(-0.10, 0.04)	(-0.13, -0.02)	(-0.10, 0.04)	(-0.13, -0.02)	(-0.10, 0.04)
Have children	-0.06^{*}	-0.07	-0.06^{*}	-0.07	-0.07^{*}	-0.08^{*}
	(-0.13, 0.01)	(-0.16, 0.02)	(-0.13, 0.01)	(-0.16, 0.02)	(-0.13, 0.0003)	(-0.17, 0.01)
Weekly religions practice	0.001	0.02	0.004	0.02	-0.01	0.004
	(-0.05, 0.06)	(-0.05, 0.08)	(-0.05, 0.06)	(-0.05, 0.08)	(-0.06, 0.05)	(-0.06, 0.07)
Unemployed	0.10^{**}	0.003	0.10^{***}	0.01	0.10^{**}	0.01
	(0.02, 0.18)	(-0.09, 0.10)	(0.03, 0.18)	(-0.08, 0.11)	(0.02, 0.18)	(-0.09, 0.10)
Student	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.02
	(-0.07, 0.13)	(-0.11, 0.13)	(-0.07, 0.13)	(-0.11, 0.13)	(-0.09, 0.11)	(-0.14, 0.10)
Retired/ on pension	0.12^{***}	0.17^{***}	0.13^{***}	0.18^{***}	0.13^{***}	0.18^{***}
	(0.04, 0.21)	(0.05, 0.28)	(0.04, 0.21)	(0.07, 0.29)	(0.04, 0.21)	(0.06, 0.29)
Constant	-1.31^{***}	-1.25^{***}	-1.27^{***}	-1.25^{***}	-1.34^{***}	-1.26^{***}
	(-1.45, -1.17)	(-1.42, -1.08)	(-1.41, -1.14)	(-1.42, -1.08)	(-1.47, -1.20)	(-1.43, -1.09)
Model	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE
N Countries	42	25	42	25	42	25
Observations	48,058	30,988	48,220	31,143	47,910	30,924
Log Likelihood	$-24,312.31$	$-15,143.41$	$-24,398.86$	$-15,225.59$	$-24,214.30$	$-15,089.80$
Akaike Inf. Crit.	48,732.62	30,362.82	48,905.72	30,527.18	48,536.60	30,255.60

Individual demographics controlled. *p$<$0.1; **p$<$0.05; ***p$<$0.01

Table 16: [WVS Individual Cliente and Confidence on Gov] Strong Demand for Redistribution

	Dependent variable:					
	Strongly Support Redistribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Poor	0.30^{***}	0.30^{***}	0.32^{***}	0.31^{***}	0.33^{***}	0.35^{***}
	(0.21, 0.39)	(0.18, 0.43)	(0.24, 0.40)	(0.20, 0.43)	(0.24, 0.42)	(0.22, 0.47)
StateCap (GE)	0.09^{**}	0.13	0.06	0.05	0.08^{**}	0.10
	(0.01, 0.16)	(−0.11, 0.36)	(−0.01, 0.14)	(−0.18, 0.28)	(0.01, 0.16)	(−0.14, 0.33)
Confidence on Gov	-0.09^{***}	0.01	-0.09^{***}	0.01	-0.09^{***}	0.01
	(−0.15, −0.04)	(−0.06, 0.08)	(−0.14, −0.03)	(−0.06, 0.07)	(−0.14, −0.03)	(−0.06, 0.08)
Cheat tax	-0.24^{***}	-0.22^{***}				
	(−0.29, −0.18)	(−0.29, −0.15)				
Accept Bribe			-0.30^{***}	-0.29^{***}		
			(−0.36, −0.24)	(−0.37, −0.22)		
Claim unentitled benefit					-0.17^{***}	-0.20^{***}
					(−0.23, −0.12)	(−0.27, −0.13)
Confidence on Gov × Poor	0.01	0.04	0.002	0.04	0.0004	0.03
	(−0.10, 0.12)	(−0.10, 0.18)	(−0.11, 0.11)	(−0.10, 0.18)	(−0.11, 0.11)	(−0.11, 0.17)
Cheat tax × Poor	0.10^{*}	−0.01				
	(−0.01, 0.22)	(−0.16, 0.14)				
Accept Bribe × Poor			0.06	−0.06		
			(−0.07, 0.18)	(−0.22, 0.09)		
Claim unentitled benefit × Poor					0.02	−0.12
					(−0.09, 0.13)	(−0.26, 0.03)
Age_s	0.04^{**}	0.05^{**}	0.04^{*}	0.05^{**}	0.04^{*}	0.05^{**}
	(0.002, 0.08)	(0.01, 0.10)	(−0.003, 0.07)	(0.0002, 0.10)	(−0.001, 0.08)	(0.002, 0.10)
Age_s^2	-0.03^{**}	−0.01	-0.03^{**}	−0.01	-0.03^{**}	−0.01
	(−0.06, −0.01)	(−0.04, 0.03)	(−0.06, −0.01)	(−0.04, 0.03)	(−0.06, −0.01)	(−0.04, 0.03)
Female	0.11^{***}	0.08^{***}	0.11^{***}	0.08^{**}	0.12^{***}	0.08^{***}
	(0.07, 0.16)	(0.02, 0.14)	(0.06, 0.16)	(0.02, 0.14)	(0.07, 0.17)	(0.02, 0.15)
Edu (below primary)	0.24^{***}	0.19^{***}	0.26^{***}	0.22^{***}	0.23^{***}	0.19^{***}
	(0.16, 0.32)	(0.10, 0.29)	(0.18, 0.34)	(0.13, 0.32)	(0.15, 0.32)	(0.10, 0.28)
Edu (primary)	0.24^{***}	0.22^{***}	0.25^{***}	0.24^{***}	0.24^{***}	0.22^{***}
	(0.17, 0.31)	(0.12, 0.31)	(0.18, 0.32)	(0.14, 0.34)	(0.16, 0.31)	(0.13, 0.32)
Edu (University)	-0.27^{***}	-0.34^{***}	-0.29^{***}	-0.35^{***}	-0.28^{***}	-0.34^{***}
	(−0.34, −0.21)	(−0.42, −0.25)	(−0.35, −0.23)	(−0.43, −0.26)	(−0.34, −0.22)	(−0.43, −0.25)
Married	-0.09^{***}	−0.06	-0.09^{***}	−0.06	-0.09^{***}	−0.06
	(−0.15, −0.04)	(−0.13, 0.01)	(−0.15, −0.04)	(−0.13, 0.02)	(−0.15, −0.03)	(−0.13, 0.02)
Have children	−0.06	−0.07	-0.06^{*}	−0.07	-0.06^{*}	-0.08^{*}
	(−0.13, 0.01)	(−0.17, 0.02)	(−0.13, 0.01)	(−0.17, 0.02)	(−0.13, 0.01)	(−0.17, 0.01)
Weekly religions practice	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01
	(−0.04, 0.08)	(−0.04, 0.10)	(−0.04, 0.08)	(−0.04, 0.10)	(−0.05, 0.07)	(−0.06, 0.08)
Unemployed	0.09^{**}	0.002	0.10^{**}	0.01	0.09^{**}	0.004
	(0.01, 0.17)	(−0.09, 0.10)	(0.02, 0.18)	(−0.09, 0.11)	(0.01, 0.18)	(−0.09, 0.10)
Student	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.02	−0.01
	(−0.06, 0.15)	(−0.10, 0.15)	(−0.06, 0.15)	(−0.09, 0.15)	(−0.08, 0.12)	(−0.13, 0.12)
Retired/ on pension	0.12^{***}	0.17^{***}	0.13^{***}	0.18^{***}	0.13^{***}	0.18^{***}
	(0.03, 0.21)	(0.05, 0.28)	(0.04, 0.21)	(0.06, 0.30)	(0.04, 0.22)	(0.06, 0.30)
Constant	-1.24^{***}	-1.21^{***}	-1.22^{***}	-1.23^{***}	-1.28^{***}	-1.24^{***}
	(−1.38, −1.10)	(−1.39, −1.04)	(−1.36, −1.08)	(−1.40, −1.06)	(−1.42, −1.14)	(−1.42, −1.07)
Model	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE
N Countries	42	25	42	25	42	25
Observations	43,863	27,116	43,998	27,247	43,743	27,071
Log Likelihood	−22,375.85	−13,391.95	−22,447.93	−13,460.16	−22,301.00	−13,355.20
Akaike Inf. Crit.	44,861.70	26,861.90	45,005.85	26,998.32	44,712.00	26,788.39

Individual demographics controlled.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.2 LAPOP

Table 17: [LAPOP] Strong Demand for Redistribution and State Capacity

	Dependent variable:		
	Strongly Support Redistribution		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\text{Income}_{v,c}$	-0.001^{***}	-0.0004^{**}	-0.0004^{**}
	$(-0.001, -0.0002)$	$(-0.001, -0.0000)$	$(-0.001, -0.0001)$
$\text{StateCap}_{nat,b}$	0.28^{***}		0.23^{***}
	(0.21, 0.34)		(0.16, 0.29)
$\text{StateCap}_{loc,b}$		0.23^{***}	0.17^{***}
		(0.17, 0.29)	(0.10, 0.23)
$\text{StateCap}_{nat,b} \times \text{Income}_{v,c}$	-0.0000		0.0001
	$(-0.0005, 0.0004)$		$(-0.0003, 0.001)$
$\text{StateCap}_{loc,b} \times \text{Income}_{v,c}$		-0.0005^{**}	-0.0005^{**}
		$(-0.001, -0.0000)$	$(-0.001, -0.0000)$
Age_s	0.02	0.02	0.02
	$(-0.02, 0.07)$	$(-0.03, 0.06)$	$(-0.02, 0.07)$
Age_s^2	-0.003	-0.01	-0.01
	$(-0.04, 0.03)$	$(-0.04, 0.03)$	$(-0.04, 0.03)$
Female	-0.07^{**}	-0.07^{**}	-0.07^{**}
	$(-0.14, -0.01)$	$(-0.13, -0.01)$	$(-0.13, -0.01)$
Urban	0.04	0.02	0.04
	$(-0.03, 0.11)$	$(-0.04, 0.09)$	$(-0.03, 0.11)$
Edu (Year of School)	0.01^{***}	0.01^{**}	0.01^{***}
	(0.003, 0.02)	(0.002, 0.02)	(0.004, 0.02)
Married	-0.09^{**}	-0.09^{**}	-0.09^{**}
	$(-0.16, -0.02)$	$(-0.16, -0.02)$	$(-0.16, -0.01)$
N children	0.14^{***}	0.14^{***}	0.14^{***}
	(0.05, 0.24)	(0.05, 0.23)	(0.04, 0.23)
Receive Remittance	0.05	0.05	0.04
	$(-0.05, 0.14)$	$(-0.05, 0.14)$	$(-0.05, 0.14)$
Unemployed	0.05	0.04	0.05
	$(-0.07, 0.16)$	$(-0.08, 0.15)$	$(-0.06, 0.17)$
Student	-0.07	-0.09	-0.07
	$(-0.21, 0.06)$	$(-0.23, 0.04)$	$(-0.21, 0.06)$
Retired/ On pension	-0.04	-0.01	-0.03
	$(-0.20, 0.13)$	$(-0.18, 0.15)$	$(-0.19, 0.14)$
Out of Labor Mkt	0.04	0.07	0.05
	$(-0.15, 0.23)$	$(-0.13, 0.26)$	$(-0.14, 0.25)$
Informal Sector	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	$(-0.09, 0.06)$	$(-0.10, 0.05)$	$(-0.09, 0.06)$
Weekly Religious Practice	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	$(-0.08, 0.04)$	$(-0.08, 0.05)$	$(-0.09, 0.04)$
Crime Victim	0.06	0.06	0.07^{*}
	$(-0.02, 0.13)$	$(-0.02, 0.13)$	$(-0.01, 0.14)$
$log(GDPpc)$	1.26^{***}	1.34^{***}	1.27^{***}
	(0.97, 1.55)	(1.05, 1.63)	(0.98, 1.57)
Net Gini Coefficient	-0.07^{***}	-0.08^{***}	-0.06^{***}
	$(-0.11, -0.02)$	$(-0.12, -0.03)$	$(-0.11, -0.02)$
Constant	-8.31^{***}	-8.51^{***}	-8.52^{***}
	$(-10.17, -6.45)$	$(-10.37, -6.64)$	$(-10.39, -6.65)$
Model	Logit FE	Logit FE	Logit FE
N Countries	15	15	15
Observations	21,381	21,403	21,158
Log Likelihood	$-12,951.87$	$-12,989.52$	$-12,812.62$
Akaike Inf. Crit.	25,969.73	26,045.05	25,695.24

Individual demographics controlled. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 18: [LAPOP] Strong Demand for Redistribution and State Capacity

	Dependent variable:			
	Strongly Support Redistribution			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Income$_{v,c}$	-0.0005^{***} (-0.001, -0.0002)	-0.001^{***} (-0.001, -0.0002)	-0.0005^{***} (-0.001, -0.0002)	-0.0005^{***} (-0.001, -0.0002)
StateCap$_b$ (safety)	0.26^{***} (0.19, 0.33)			
StateCap$_b$ (ManageEcon)		0.29^{***} (0.22, 0.36)		
StateCap$_b$ (FightPoverty)			0.24^{***} (0.18, 0.31)	
StateCap (PC1)				0.03^{***} (0.01, 0.05)
StateCap$_b$ (safety) $\times$ Income$_{v,c}$	0.0000 (-0.0005, 0.0005)			
StateCap$_b$ (ManageEcon) $\times$ Income$_{v,c}$		0.0002 (-0.0003, 0.001)		
StateCap$_b$ (FightPoverty) $\times$ Income$_{v,c}$			-0.0000 (-0.0005, 0.0005)	
StateCap (PC1) $\times$ Income$_{v,c}$				0.0000 (-0.0001, 0.0001)
Age$_s$	0.03 (-0.02, 0.07)	0.02 (-0.03, 0.07)	0.03 (-0.02, 0.07)	0.02 (-0.02, 0.07)
Age$_s^2$	-0.01 (-0.04, 0.03)	-0.01 (-0.04, 0.03)	-0.01 (-0.04, 0.02)	-0.01 (-0.04, 0.03)
Female	-0.09^{***} (-0.16, -0.03)	-0.09^{***} (-0.15, -0.02)	-0.09^{***} (-0.16, -0.03)	-0.09^{***} (-0.16, -0.03)
Urban	0.03 (-0.04, 0.10)	0.03 (-0.04, 0.10)	0.03 (-0.04, 0.09)	0.02 (-0.04, 0.09)
Edu (Year of School)	0.01^{***} (0.004, 0.02)	0.01^{***} (0.004, 0.02)	0.01^{***} (0.004, 0.02)	0.01^{***} (0.003, 0.02)
Married	-0.07^{*} (-0.15, 0.002)	-0.07^{*} (-0.15, 0.001)	-0.08^{**} (-0.15, -0.001)	-0.08^{**} (-0.15, -0.001)
N children	0.13^{***} (0.03, 0.23)	0.13^{***} (0.03, 0.23)	0.13^{***} (0.03, 0.23)	0.13^{***} (0.03, 0.23)
Receive Remittance	0.05 (-0.05, 0.15)	0.05 (-0.05, 0.14)	0.05 (-0.05, 0.15)	0.05 (-0.05, 0.15)
Unemployed	0.03 (-0.08, 0.15)	0.04 (-0.08, 0.15)	0.03 (-0.09, 0.15)	0.03 (-0.09, 0.14)
Student	-0.09 (-0.23, 0.04)	-0.09 (-0.22, 0.05)	-0.09 (-0.23, 0.04)	-0.09 (-0.23, 0.05)
Retired/ On pension	-0.01 (-0.17, 0.16)	0.0003 (-0.17, 0.17)	-0.003 (-0.17, 0.17)	-0.01 (-0.17, 0.16)
Out of Labor Mkt	0.02 (-0.18, 0.22)	0.02 (-0.18, 0.21)	0.03 (-0.17, 0.22)	0.02 (-0.18, 0.21)
Informal Sector	-0.04 (-0.12, 0.04)	-0.04 (-0.11, 0.04)	-0.04 (-0.12, 0.04)	-0.04 (-0.12, 0.04)
Weekly Religious Practice	-0.02 (-0.08, 0.05)	-0.02 (-0.08, 0.05)	-0.02 (-0.08, 0.04)	-0.02 (-0.08, 0.05)
Crime Victim	0.08^{**} (0.001, 0.16)	0.08^{*} (-0.0003, 0.15)	0.07^{*} (-0.004, 0.15)	0.07^{*} (-0.01, 0.15)
$log(GDPpc)$	1.33^{***} (1.02, 1.63)	1.18^{***} (0.87, 1.48)	1.25^{***} (0.95, 1.56)	1.27^{***} (0.96, 1.57)
Net Gini Coefficient	-0.08^{***} (-0.12, -0.03)	-0.07^{***} (-0.11, -0.02)	-0.07^{***} (-0.12, -0.03)	-0.07^{***} (-0.12, -0.03)
Constant	-8.42^{***} (-10.32, -6.51)	-7.50^{***} (-9.40, -5.59)	-7.73^{***} (-9.63, -5.83)	-7.80^{***} (-9.70, -5.90)
Model	Logit FE	Logit FE	Logit FE	Logit FE
N Countries	15	15	15	15
Observations	20,019	20,019	20,019	20,019
Log Likelihood	$-12,206.25$	$-12,199.06$	$-12,209.85$	$-12,229.72$
Akaike Inf. Crit.	24,478.51	24,464.11	24,485.70	24,525.43

Individual demographics controlled. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 19: [LAPOP] Strong Demand for Redistribution and Clientelism

	Dependent variable:			
	Strongly Support Redistribution			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Income$_{v,c}$	-0.001^{***} $(-0.001, -0.0003)$	-0.001^{***} $(-0.001, -0.0002)$	-0.0004^{**} $(-0.001, -0.0000)$	-0.0004^{**} $(-0.001, -0.0001)$
Offered Cliente Benefit	-0.10^{**} $(-0.19, -0.002)$	-0.09^{*} $(-0.19, 0.01)$	-0.09^{*} $(-0.19, 0.003)$	-0.09^{*} $(-0.18, 0.01)$
StateCap$_{nat,b}$		0.28^{***} $(0.21, 0.34)$		0.23^{***} $(0.16, 0.29)$
StateCap$_{loc,b}$			0.23^{***} $(0.17, 0.29)$	0.16^{***} $(0.10, 0.23)$
Offered Cliente Benefit $\times$ Income$_{v,c}$	0.0002 $(-0.0005, 0.001)$	0.0003 $(-0.0004, 0.001)$	0.0002 $(-0.0005, 0.001)$	0.0002 $(-0.0005, 0.001)$
StateCap$_{nat,b}$ $\times$ Income$_{v,c}$		-0.0000 $(-0.0005, 0.0004)$		0.0001 $(-0.0003, 0.001)$
StateCap$_{loc,b}$ $\times$ Income$_{v,c}$			-0.0005^{**} $(-0.001, -0.0000)$	-0.0005^{**} $(-0.001, -0.0000)$
Age$_s$	0.02 $(-0.03, 0.06)$	0.02 $(-0.02, 0.07)$	0.02 $(-0.03, 0.06)$	0.02 $(-0.02, 0.07)$
Age$_s^2$	-0.001 $(-0.03, 0.03)$	-0.004 $(-0.04, 0.03)$	-0.01 $(-0.04, 0.02)$	-0.01 $(-0.04, 0.03)$
Female	-0.08^{**} $(-0.14, -0.02)$	-0.08^{**} $(-0.14, -0.01)$	-0.07^{**} $(-0.14, -0.01)$	-0.07^{**} $(-0.13, -0.01)$
Urban	0.02 $(-0.04, 0.09)$	0.04 $(-0.03, 0.11)$	0.02 $(-0.04, 0.09)$	0.04 $(-0.03, 0.11)$
Edu (Year of School)	0.01^{**} $(0.001, 0.02)$	0.01^{***} $(0.003, 0.02)$	0.01^{**} $(0.002, 0.02)$	0.01^{***} $(0.004, 0.02)$
Married	-0.09^{**} $(-0.16, -0.02)$	-0.09^{**} $(-0.16, -0.02)$	-0.09^{**} $(-0.16, -0.02)$	-0.09^{**} $(-0.16, -0.01)$
N children	0.14^{***} $(0.05, 0.24)$	0.14^{***} $(0.05, 0.24)$	0.14^{***} $(0.05, 0.23)$	0.14^{***} $(0.04, 0.23)$
Receive Remittance	0.06 $(-0.04, 0.15)$	0.05 $(-0.05, 0.14)$	0.05 $(-0.05, 0.14)$	0.04 $(-0.05, 0.14)$
Unemployed	0.03 $(-0.08, 0.14)$	0.05 $(-0.06, 0.17)$	0.04 $(-0.07, 0.15)$	0.05 $(-0.06, 0.17)$
Student	-0.09 $(-0.22, 0.04)$	-0.07 $(-0.21, 0.06)$	-0.09 $(-0.23, 0.04)$	-0.08 $(-0.21, 0.06)$
Retired/ On pension	-0.03 $(-0.19, 0.13)$	-0.04 $(-0.20, 0.12)$	-0.02 $(-0.18, 0.14)$	-0.03 $(-0.19, 0.13)$
Out of Labor Mkt	0.03 $(-0.15, 0.22)$	0.04 $(-0.15, 0.23)$	0.07 $(-0.12, 0.26)$	0.05 $(-0.14, 0.25)$
Informal Sector	-0.03 $(-0.10, 0.05)$	-0.02 $(-0.09, 0.06)$	-0.02 $(-0.10, 0.05)$	-0.01 $(-0.09, 0.06)$
Weekly Religious Practice	-0.01 $(-0.07, 0.05)$	-0.02 $(-0.08, 0.04)$	-0.01 $(-0.08, 0.05)$	-0.02 $(-0.08, 0.04)$
Crime Victim	0.05 $(-0.02, 0.13)$	0.06 $(-0.01, 0.14)$	0.06 $(-0.01, 0.14)$	0.07^{*} $(-0.01, 0.15)$
$log(GDPpc)$	1.33^{***} $(1.04, 1.61)$	1.26^{***} $(0.97, 1.55)$	1.34^{***} $(1.05, 1.63)$	1.27^{***} $(0.98, 1.56)$
Net Gini Coefficient	-0.08^{***} $(-0.12, -0.04)$	-0.06^{***} $(-0.10, -0.02)$	-0.07^{***} $(-0.12, -0.03)$	-0.06^{***} $(-0.10, -0.02)$
Constant	-8.13^{***} $(-9.97, -6.28)$	-8.34^{***} $(-10.20, -6.48)$	-8.53^{***} $(-10.39, -6.67)$	-8.54^{***} $(-10.41, -6.67)$
Model	Logit FE	Logit FE	Logit FE	Logit FE
N Countries	15	15	15	15
Observations	21,705	21,381	21,403	21,158
Log Likelihood	$-13,193.05$	$-12,950.13$	$-12,987.73$	$-12,811.03$
Akaike Inf. Crit.	26,452.09	25,970.27	26,045.45	25,696.07

Individual demographics controlled. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01