Electoral Politics

- **Fearon.** Election is about selecting good type. not sanctioning bad performance
  - Voters' two way of thinking about election
    - **Selecting good type [Fearon's claim]:** voters choose the "good" candidate that deserves the honor of political authority. But don't care whether she act on their behalf
      - **Criteria**
        - **voters' welfare during the candidates' service**
        - **"pork" delivered**
        - **Personal characters**
        - **Policies advocated**
    - **Accountability:** Voters think the elected official will act on their behalf because they care about reelection
  - Empiricics against "accountability"
    - People dislike "office seekers"
    - People support term limit, which defeat "accountability"
    - US presidents do not shirk in their second terms
  - How repeated elections work?
    - Repeated opportunities to sort among types

- **Cox (1999).** Electoral system --> coordination within a party
  - **Theory: strategic entering of politicians at local level. Strategic votings of voters at local level. Two M +1 rules**
    - **For a M-seat district (M seats elected in the district, only M+1 candidates will enter the election <- strategic choice of a party.**
    - **Even if >M+1 candidates enter, the voters will only concentrate their votes on M+1 candidates, because they don't want to waste their votes.**
  - Empirical measurement: Effective Number of Parties (national, average)
    - **ENP = 1 / (sum(v_i^2)).** where v is the proportion of vote a party receive in an election.
  - Local coordination
    - **PARTY SIDE. Single-member district. Game.** 2 parties. 2 potential candidates from left. 1 candidate from right. If only 1 left candidate, it will with Probability 1 ==> left will nominate only one candidate only when:
      - Everyone should agree only two parties
      - Two left candidates have he same expectation
      - Both left candidates care only about the outcome of current election
    - **PARTY SIDE: Multi-member district.** Empirics: LDP.'s successful coordination Theory: M+1 rule. generalization of Duverger's argument. **Assumptions: (1)** Politicians have precise expectation about the ranking of politicians. (2) politicians only care about current election. **Implication:** The top (M-1) seats are not issue of discussion. The uncertainty is only about the Mth seat. Typically 2 competitors. ==> M+1 candidates for M seats.
    - **PARTY SIDE: Multi-member district with list.** Empirics: Chile. Rule: the first seat in any district goes to the list with the highest vote total. If this list has more than double the vote total of the second-place list, then it also wins the second seat; Otherwise the second-place list does.
    - **VOTER SIDE:** strategic voting. (2) *Voters care about current election --> concentrate vote on M+1 candidates.* (2) Voters who care about expressing their true pref. or about affecting the outcome of future elections, may vote for a candidate even if they recognize he or she has little chance to win.
  - Linkage: **local** party systems --> **national** system. What determines the strength of coordination of different local parties
    - **Institutional factors.** What's the incentive for cross-district alliance? (1) a party wants to win upper tier legislative election and presidential elections; (2) a party wants to control the central government.
      - Empirics 1: **India and the US.** Economic and political centralization --> Increased number of national parties
      - Empirics 2: **Brazil.** Fiscally decentralized state --> parties have different local specific strongholds
    - Social cleavages.
      - **Local level:** more heterogeneous --> worse coordination --> local more candidates/ parties
      - **National level system:** not clear. Depends on district line and relevant electoral threshold. Pass the threshold --> join election; not pass threshold --> alliance with others.

- **Downs (1957)** a "ROAD MAP" piece about election. How Citizens and Governments choose rationally in electoral politics
  - It is wrong to assume a benevolent government that maximizes social welfare. also wrong to assume "good citizens" that participate for a good society
    - GOV: Not clear what is "social welfare", how to "maximize. (Arrow's Impossibility: mathematically no rational method to maximize social welfare unless strong restriction of preference ordering holds
    - GOV: Even if there is a social welfare to maximize, government has private motives. It does not WANT to maximize social welfare.
    - CITIZEN: Voting after rational calculation. not necessarily want to know about the candidate/ policy
  - Rationality
    - Parties: Parties formulate policy strictly as a means to gaining vote ==> government is vote maximizing
    - Voters: Maximizes net benefit of voting = benefit of vote "correctly" - cost of vote "incorrectly" - cost of gaining information
  - Imperfect knowledge
    - Governments do not have perfect knowledge on what citizens want
    - Citizens do not have perfect knowledge on what policies are and their effect
      - IDEOLOGY: a "**short cut**" due to imperfect knowledge. Citizens "vote for ideology" because they don't know about exact policies. Parties strategically accommodate this need by "choosing side" in ideology.
      - Have incentive to collect information about politics because they ...
        - Feel good about being informed
        - expect the election to be close one. i.e. expect their high political efficacy
        - want to influence others' vote
        - Want to lobby the government
          - Information required for lobbyist is more costly to collect. Incentive: income stem on the policy area the lobbyist work on
  - Party's selection of policy positions
    - Adapt Hotelling's theory
      - Parties ordered from left to right, agreed upon by all voters
      - Voters have single-peaked preferences
      - Frequency Distribution of voters along the left-right scale is variable from society to society. but fixed in one society
      - Parties can move on the scale. BUT not beyond the nearest party toward which it is moving
      - **In a two party system: if a party moves away from the extreme nearest towards other party, extremist voters may ABSTAIN!**
    - Three possibilities parties' choice of policy position, depend on distribution of voters
      - **near-nomal:** parties converge at the median
      - **Bimodal** (polarized preference): parties not converge. if move to the median, lose more extremists (who abstain) than gain ing from the middle. Example: US
      - **Multimodel:** several parties, each party at a mode. if move, may lose vote to neighbor party or extermist may abstain. Example: multiparty



- Different Democratic Election system
  - **Huber, Powell (1994) Congruence** under two visions of democracy.
  - **Patterson-Lindborm.** Theory: Direct democracy ==> elites capture more, less redistribution. Reason: strong agenda-setting power, intimidation for vote, unorganized voters. Representative democracy ==> 40 - 60% more public welfare than direct democracies. Reason: Organized voters. (support Acemoglu and Robinson -- de facto power of elites in direct democracy. **Empirics**: Sweden. 1919 transition democracy. impose two forms at local level simultaneously.

Process Stages	*Majority Control Vision*	*Proportionate Influence Vision*
Electoral competition	identifiable alternative governments, one a responsible incumbent, one or both close to the median voter	wide range of party choice; absence of explicit coalition commitments
Election outcomes	party close to median voter wins majority	proportionate legislative representation of all parties and voters
Government formation	election winner forms majority government	bargaining: government coalition includes the median legislator
Policy-making between elections	government dominates all policy-making	coalitions may change but still include median; negotiation with opposition parties may help balance government parties right or left of median party
Congruence prediction	government is the policymaker and is close to the median voter	government includes median legislator, but average weight of all policymakers will be closer to the median voter

FIGURE 1
VISIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND PROCESSES THAT CREATE CONGRUENCE BETWEEN VOTERS AND POLICYMAKERS

- Party/ politicians' linkage with voters
  - **Kitschelt: Economic development** determines parties' linkage strategy. Poor democracy ==> parties appeal to poor electoral ==> clientelism; Affluent democracy ==> parties appeal to affluent citizens ==> programatic accountability. **Formal institution is not relevant in accountability and responsiveness.**
    - Demand side factors (voters)
      - Scaling up of social network ==> clientelistic linkage give way to class, sectoral, and profesional linkage
      - Discount rate. people have scant asset discount future benefit (i.e. programmatic policies) more radically ==> poor demands clientelistic linkage
      - Cognitive sophistication in the calculation of costs and benefit. Pooor = less education ==> unable to reflect cost and benefit rationally
    - Supply side factors (parties)
      - Network monitoring. poor = low mobility = less costly network monitoring
      - Constraint on acquiring resources to reply in clientelistic exchange. voters' "ask" for benefit increases exponentially with asset. But party's resources increase with economy only linearly
      - Ethnocultural division facilitate supply of clientelistic linkage
      - Media exposure to clientelistic politics
  - Gingerich (2013) **Institutions matter!**
    - **Empirics:** Brazil introduced Australian Ballot ==> (1) ideology balance shifts to left; (2) does not weaken vote brokers; (3) increase the proportion of wasted votes casted in election

- **Electoral system as dependent variables. * (extra) Origin of electoral system**
  - **What causes electoral system change? (Benoit 2007).** We read Cusack et al.: historically economic collective organization ==> PR (consensus based political negotiation) [Iversen Soskice] ==> Center-left dominate ==> more redistribution
  - Empirics: Scheiner (2008). cases: Japan, Italy, New Zealand. Direction: all adopt mixed district. Result -- disappointing. Japan: still one dominant party. Italy: fragmentation of party system not changed. Author: who initiate the reform, the process of the reform, and other explanatory variables important.

TABLE 1 Dimensions of electoral system change and key references

Agents of Change		
Parties	General party-oriented explanations	Colomer (2005), Benoit (2004), Boix (1999)
Non-party actors	Example: presidents in Poland, Russia	Benoit & Hayden (2004), Remington & Smith (1996)
External actors	Colonial influences	Blais & Massicote (1997), Golder & Wantchekon (2004)
Non-political experts	Example: parts of Hungarian electoral law	Benoit & Schiemann 2001
	Single transferable vote in Ireland	Gallagher 2005
History	Previously chosen options as focal points	Elster et al. (1998)
	Bulgaria as example	Ashley (1990)
	Historical patterns influencing future institutions	Kitschelt et al. (1999), Jowitt (1992)
Society	Hypothesis that PR occurred first in most heterogeneous societies	Rokkan (1970)
	Size	Dahl & Tufte (1973)
	Social structure	Golder & Wantchekon (2004), Mozaffar (1998)
Economy	Dependency on external trade	Rogowski (1987)
	Nature and dispersion of economic interests	Cusack et al. (2004)
Chance	Historical idiosyncracy: STV in Ireland	Carstairs (1980)
	Electoral reform in New Zealand	Nagel (2004)
	Unexplainable forces	Sait (1938)
Goals and Preferences		
General	Direct versus derived preferences	Tsebelis (1990)
Office-seeking	General explanations	Colomer (2004), Benoit (2004), Boix (1999)
	Examples: Hungary, Poland, Russia, Taiwan	Benoit & Schiemann (2001), Benoit & Hayden (2004), Remington & Smith (1996), Brady & Mo (1992)
Policy-seeking	General	Katz (2005)
	Examples: Germany, France	Bawn (1993), Elgie (2005)
Representation and governability	General	Dunleavy & Margetts (1995)
Social and political engineering	To effect ethnic moderation	Horowitz (1985)
Legitimacy and fairness	In Eastern European choices	Birch et al. (2002)
Other general motivations	Making elections accessible and meaningful	Reynolds & Reilly (1997)
Special Considerations		
Founding institutional choices	Role of uncertainty	Andrews & Jackman (2006), Birch (2003), Shvetsova (2003)
	Importance of social considerations and informal agreements	Benoit & Shiemann (2001)
	Exigencies of democratic transition	Mozaffar (2004)
	Rules secondary to transition itself	Birch et al. (2002)
Stability and equilibrium	Stability versus change as the norm	Lijphart (1994), Katz (2005), Colomer (2005), Boix (1999)
	Constitutional entrenchment	Birch (2003), Klima (2000)
	Structurally induced equilibrium	Shepsle (1979), Shepsle (1986)
	Entrenchment of interests	Benoit (2004), Colomer (2005), Mitchell (2005)
	Role of transaction costs	Shepsle (1989)

- Authoritarian election. (Gandhi and Lust-Okar) (extra)
  - Role of authoritarian election for the rulers
    - Information: ruler want to know information about (1) opposition; (2) if the the subordinates work hard
    - Distribute spoils and office. Co-opt elites
    - Projecting power: "I am popular! See I win so many votes in the election!"
  - Role of authoritarian elections for the voters