An individual has a "counter" in his mind. Every time he/she is exposed to information about certain policies or politicians, but not necessarily know why. He/she weights them in terms of their relevance, and then forgets about the information he/she is exposed to. Information that they retrieve from their memory shapes beliefs, thus change the "rank" in individual's comparative evaluation among alternatives. Change preference:

Preference --> shape belief --> Preference Formation

Inequality create incentives for people to extract externalities in their work. Individuals' preference on redistribution is shaped by their perception of redistribution's effect. For instance, Protestant favors redistribution. For instance, Protestant favors redistribution. Thus people care about the incentive effect of redistribution. Inequality is decomposed into two parts. The model is a variant of the above. Ideal level of redistribution supports the POUM (Picketty, 2013) argument.

Potential enemies of redistribution include: 1. The rich who resist reduced income inequality. This group of literature on redistributive politics is largely based on the ENAMIX model, whereas the theories are not directly linked to tax and redistribution issues. 2. The rich who insist on redistribution. The theories are based on political economy and the literature on preference formation (e.g., POUM, Lupia 2000). The theories are based on political economy. They do not consider redistribution issues.

How many levels of analysis are relevant? Risk and risky behavior (say, participating in a civil war) are typically studied in the framework of evolutionary biology. How does one think inequality also consists of two parts: "luck" (you are poor because you are at bad luck) and "effort" (you are poor because you do not put in enough effort to work hard). These are important for the understanding of how inequality is perceived and how it is distributed. The model is a variant of the above. Ideal level of redistribution supports the POUM (Picketty, 2013) argument. The model is a variant of the above. Ideal level of redistribution supports the POUM (Picketty, 2013) argument. The model is a variant of the above. Ideal level of redistribution supports the POUM (Picketty, 2013) argument. The model is a variant of the above. Ideal level of redistribution supports the POUM (Picketty, 2013) argument.

Empirics: 18 OECD countries. Result: one standard deviation increase in redistribution should support LESS redistribution. The model is a variant of the above. Ideal level of redistribution supports the POUM (Picketty, 2013) argument. The model is a variant of the above. Ideal level of redistribution supports the POUM (Picketty, 2013) argument. The model is a variant of the above. Ideal level of redistribution supports the POUM (Picketty, 2013) argument. The model is a variant of the above. Ideal level of redistribution supports the POUM (Picketty, 2013) argument. The model is a variant of the above. Ideal level of redistribution supports the POUM (Picketty, 2013) argument. The model is a variant of the above. Ideal level of redistribution supports the POUM (Picketty, 2013) argument. The model is a variant of the above. Ideal level of redistribution supports the POUM (Picketty, 2013) argument. The model is a variant of the above. Ideal level of redistribution supports the POUM (Picketty, 2013) argument.